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INTRODUCTION
Thinking about something can exert a powerful influence on how
favorably or unfavorably a person feels about it. "Thinking it over"
is a familiar strategy for "sorting out your feelings," and for
determining how you "really" feel. Feelings arrived at after careful
reflection on available information are generally regarded as more
trustworthy guides to action than feelings that have not received the
benefit of thought. According to the prevailing common sense, acting
on "impulse," without thinking, may negate whatever knowledge a person
has gained through past experience, and may perpetuate a cycle of
mistakes and failures. In contrast, it is widely believed that
thinking before acting can bring acquired knowledge to bear on the
person's view of the present situation, and increase the likelihood
that the person's feelings will prompt actions resulting in desired
consequences
.
Suppose, for example, that a chess player notices that her
opponent's last move of his queen suddenly has removed protection from
a crucial pawn on which she has been focusing her attack. Perhaps the
1
2opponent has u/ithdraiun his queen to the opposite corner of the board,
where it is shielded from any immediate threat. Pleased with this turn
of events, the player's first thought might be that her opponent has
recognized that further defense of the pawn endangers the queen, and
has prudently decided to retreat rather than risking inevitable loss of
the game. Without thinking further, she might proceed to capture the
pawn. On the other hand, she might continue to consider the meaning of
her opponent's action. A second, not so pleasing thought might dawn
on her. The enemy's queen is now in position to form a devastating
combination with his knight and rook that could lead to checkmate in
three moves. Armed with her second thought, she decides to move her
bishop to a square where it can help defend the king. This second
thought may have saved her game.
Of course, losing a chess game is not the worst thing in the
world and this example may seem trivial. But the treacherous first
thought is no stranger in any sphere of life. Who has not had the
experience of making a foolish blunder on the basis of a sudden impulse
founded on a nebulous idea, when only a moment's reflection would have
revealed the folly of taking that particular course? When the
President of the United States recently joked into an open microphone
that he would "begin bombing the Russians in five minutes," his
subsequent disclaimers revealed that he never would have made such a
dangerous remark if he had been using his head. The only fortunate
aspect of the incident was that the President's poorly thought out
action was purely verbal. There is no guarantee that he, or his Soviet
3counterpart, may not some day permit a similar impulse to result in an
order to unleash the nuclear holocaust. Acting only on immediate
hostile thoughts and feelings, without taking time to think, the
world's rulers could destroy the planet Earth, and all her people.
There is much uisdom in the common sense view of the importance of
careful thinking.
The consequences of acting before the thought process has had time
to produce the often critical second thought can be dire, possibly
fatal, both for individuals and society. So it is appropriate for
social psychologists to take this insight as a starting point for
theory and research. This thesis is a report of an experimental
investigation guided by the idea that thinking tends to increase the
realism of people's views of the world. As will be seen, that idea
stands in opposition to the alternative concept that thinking is likely
to increase the polarization of a person's attitude toward the object
of thought (Tesser, 1978). The first few chapters explore the basis of
the attitude polarization position; the later chapters develop theory
and present experimental evidence in support of the attitude realism
position.
In formal terms, common sense suggests the hypothesis that
thinking about an object will tend to adapt the affect a person
experiences toward the object to greater congruence with its real
motivational significance. A theoretical basis for this prediction can
be found in the following two assumptions:
1 . Thinking about an object will tend to produce a more veridical
cognitiv/e representation of the object's motivational significance,
that is, a representation that more accurately specifies houj the object
might facilitate or impede accomplishment of the person's goals
(Carlson, 1956, Lewin, 1951; Rosenberg, 1956).
2. The person's cognitive representation of an object determines
his or her affect in regard to the object (Fishbein, 1963; Fishbein &
Ajzen, 1975; Fishbein & Feldman, 1963; Rosenberg, 1956).
The first assumption asserts that thinking about an object normal-
ly serves to provide a person with a more realistic understanding of
the likely results of interaction with the object. The second
assumption links this improved understanding of the motivational signi-
ficance of the object to change in the person's feelings about the
object. If cognitive representation determines affect, then a more
veridical representation should result in more adaptive affect. If
thinking tends to result in a more veridical representation, then
thinking should tend to result in more adaptive affect.
Plany social psychologists have favored an alternative to the first
assumption about the likely outcome of thinking that emphasizes the
internal dynamics of the cognitive representation, instead of the
relation between the representation and the external object it
represents. These theorists assume that thinking about an object will
tend to produce a more internally consistent representation of the
object's relation to the person, rather than a more veridical one (e.g.
Abelson & Rosenberg, 1 958; Festinger, 1 957; Heider, 1946; Neiucomb,
1947, 1953; Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955). They argue that the presence
5of inconsistent elements within a cognitive structure arouses a motive
or drive to reduce inconsistency (WcGuire, 1966; Singer, 1966).
Various definitions of inconsistency have been proposed, along
uiith alternative terms for the concept (e.g. imbalance, incongruity,
dissonance, ambivalence), but all refer to an internal state of
cognitive structure that is unstable and tends to change toward a more
stable structure. Note that a more stable structure is not necessarily
a more veridical representation; consistency theorists have stressed
the essentially autistic nature of the processes that tend to construct
consistent cognitive representations (Neuicomb, 1947; Pepitone, 1966).
Investigators employing a cognitive consistency framework have
demonstrated that people readily produce consistent representations
that are clearly false from a "realistic" point of view (e.g.
Festinger, Riecken, & Schachter, 1956).
The assumption that thinking tends to increase consistency— rather
than veridicality--of representation leads to a prediction about the
impact of thinking on feeling that contrasts with the common sense
hypothesis that thinking adapts feeling to reality. This alternative
hypothesis also rests on the second assumption that the person's
cognitive representation of an object determines feeling about the
object. Rather than adapting feeling about an object to the real
situation in which the person interacts with it, thinking may tend to
polarize, that is, intensify, the initial affective value of the
object. A recent line of research has produced evidence in support of
the hypothesis that "thought intensifies feeling" (Tesser, 1978 p.
6298).
Abraham Tesser and his colleagues have reported a series of
investigations that appear to show that thinking about an object tends
to lead to a more polarized attitude toward the object (Clary, Tesser,
& Downing, 1978; Tesser, 1976, 1978; Tesser & Conlee, 1975; Tesser &
Cowan, 1975; Tesser & Danheiser, 1978; Tesser & Leone, 1977; Sadler &
Tesser, 1973). In Tesser's usage, and as defined here, attitude refers
to a person's affective evaluation of an object, i.e., how favorably or
unfavorably the person feels about the object (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975;
Fishbein & Raven, 1962; Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum, 1957; Thurstone,
1935). The primary hypothesis tested in Tesser's "mere thought"
research program has been "that thought about some particular object in
the absence of any new information will tend to produce attitude
polarization" (Tesser, 1978 p. 298).
Tesser derives his hypothesis from cognitive consistency theory.
His central explanatory principle is that thinking about an object
without an outside source of information will tend to produce a
progressively more consistent set of thoughts in working memory and,
hence, a more extreme attitude (Tesser, 1978). The requirement that no
new information be available to the person is necessary to isolate the
effects of thinking per se from the effects of any directive influence
contained in information communicated to the person.
Tesser's "mere thought" attitude polarization research has been
widely cited (e.g. Brehm, 1983; Burnstein & Schul, 1982; Caccioppo &
Petty, 1981; Petty & Caccioppo, 1979; Fazio et al., 1982; Judd & Lusk,
71984; Taylor & Thompson, 1982) and the "mere thought" polarization of
attitudes generally has been regarded as a replicable phenomenon. Yet,
as indicated above, there are common sense reasons to remain skeptical
about the polarization hypothesis. Thinking ought to serve an adaptive
function, but there is no reason to believe that attitude polarization
is usually adaptive. Although a more extreme attitude toward an object
may be adaptive in many cases, in many other cases a less extreme
attitude, a reversal in attitude, or no attitude change at all would be
a more adaptive outcome of thinking.
If thinking does have some predictable effect on attitude, it can
be argued that depolarization is a more likely outcome than
polarization. As evidence to be reported here demonstrates, a person's
initial thoughts about an object are likely to be consistent with the
his or her overall attitude toward the object but, after a while,
inconsistent "second thoughts" are likely to arise. Such second
thoughts can be viewed as corrections to the person's overly one-sided
first thoughts. Objects invariably have both good and bad aspects, as
has been recognized at least since the time of Plato (Russell, 1942),
and a veridical representation of an object will include both favorable
and unfavorable attributes. Granting that the current cognitive
representation of an object determines current feelings about it, the
occurrence of second thoughts ought to moderate the intensity of
feeling, rather than increase it. Despite these grounds for doubting
the "mere thought" polarization hypothesis, it has so far provoked
little controversy, and has been more or less uncritically accepted.
8The present investigation is intended to subject the polarization
hypothesis to needed critical attention.
There are two basic components of the ujork presented here. The
first is an attempt to assess the v/alidity of the "mere thought"
polarization research. The initial chapters of this thesis review
Tesser's theory, experimental procedures, and evidence. The most
serious problem that they examine is Tesser's faulty operationalization
of the "mere thought" situation itself. Despite his requirement that
external sources of biasing information be excluded from the
experimental situation, his actual methods depend on providing subjects
with new information about novel objects. The chapters also point out
a set of less central methodological issues that obscure the
interpretation of Tesser's findings.
The second component of the present investigation is a series of
three experiments performed to address the issues that Tesser's work
raises. The experiments were undertaken primarily as an attempt at
an independent replication of the attitude polarization effect. The
second major objective was to test the opposing hypothesis that thought
may tend to depolarize attitudes. The procedures were designed, in
large part, to circumvent the problems in Tesser's procedures that are
discussed below.
gPlan of the Thesis
This paper is organized according to the following plan. Chapters
2 - 4 revieu, Tesser's "mere thought" attitude change research. Chapter
2 explores his theoretical basis for deriv/ing the polarization
hypothesis. Chapter 3 examines the experimental evidence that Tesser
has put forward in support of the hypothesis, and the experimental
procedures used to obtain the evidence. Chapter 4 presents a
critique of the "mere thought" research; besides pointing out a number
of difficulties in previous work, it describes features of the present
study aimed at avoiding these problems.
The remaining chapters describe the current experimental
investigation and its findings. Chapter 5 explicates the present
theoretical model of the persuasion and attitude change process.
Chapter 6 states the objectives of the study, and provides operational
definitions of the relevant variables. Chapter 7 details the methods
used in carrying out the experiments. Chapter 8 reports the findings.
The results are discussed in Chapter 9.
Appendix A contains printouts of the CRT screen displays seen by
subjects in the study's experimental conditions.
CHAPTER II
DERIVATION OF THE "PIERE THOUGHT" POLARIZATION HYPOTHESIS
The prediction that thinking about something, given no neu.
information, u/ill tend to polarize a person's attitude touiard the
object, u,as deriv/ed from theory rather than induced from empirical
ev/idence. This chapter focuses on Tesser's derivation of the
polarization hypothesis, and considers his argument's roots in the
literature.
The Underlying Assumptions
Tesser has specified three core assumptions that, taken together,
form a theoretical basis for the polarization hypothesis. They state
that
:
1 . "For various stimulus domains persons have naive theories or
schemas which make some attributes of the stimuli salient and
provide rules for inferences regarding other attributes;
2. Thought, under the direction of a schema, produces changes in
beliefs, and these changes are often in the direction of greater
schematic and evaluative consistency;
3. Attitudes are a function of one's beliefs."
(Tesser, 1978, p. 290)
1 0
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The second and third of Tesser's assumptions have been mentioned
already. The assumption that thinking uiill tend to increase cognitiv/e
consistency, or consistency of beliefs, combined uiith the assumption
that beliefs determine attitudes, provides the fundamental rationale
for the polarization prediction. The first of Tesser's assumptions,
that cognitive schemes are active in controlling thought processes,
provides a substitute for the drive-reduction model that traditional
consistency theories offered as an explanation for the putative
tendency to greater consistency (Shaw it Constanzo, 1970). In the
following three sections, each of the three assumptions will be
considered in some depth.
Cognitive Schemes
In explaining what is meant by "schema", Tesser cites Frederick
Bartlett's classic definition. According to Bartlett (1932), a schema
is "an active organization of past reactions, or of past experiences,
which always must be supposed to be operating in any well-adapted
organic response" (p. 201). Put differently, information is not simply
accumulated in inert storage structures in memory, but is incorporated
into active systems that control behavior directed towards the objects
that they model, and, as Bartlett emphasizes, are capable of "turning
back upon themselves" to alter their own structure. Bartlett's notion
of schema has been taken up by many contemporary cognitive psych-
ologists, and restated and elaborated in modern terms.
Tesser identifies David Rumelhart's influential treatment of the
1 2
schema concept (Rumelhart, 1975; Rumelhart & Ortony, 1976) ojith his ouin
v/ieu/s on the matter (Tesser, 1978 p. 290). Rumelhart defines a schema
"as a data structure for representing the generic concepts stored in
memory" (Rumelhart, 1980 p. 34). He describes tu,o functions that
schemata perform in the process of remembering past experience. First,
while an event is occurring, a person's schemata act as mechanisms that
construct an interpretation of the event. The interpretation is
developed by means of a reciprocal process in which sense data is
initially matched with one or more of the schemata stored in memory,
that then assume control of the process by conducting a search for
additional sense data and relevant data in memory that can define the
values of variables not contained in the initial set of data. When the
interpretation is more or less completed, it is stored as a trace in
long term memory. Sense data themselves are not stored, according to
Rumelhart, but only the the interpretation that the person has given
these data.
The second function comes into play during recollection. The
information stored in the interpretation formed at the time of the
event must be reinterpreted in order for the event to be remembered.
Recollection requires a process of construction very similar to that
involved in the original perception of an event, Rumelhart argues.
Whatever fragments of information about the event that are preserved in
memory are matched with appropriate schemata in much the same way in
which the initial sense data was matched. These schemata then search
for additional fragments of information about the event in order to
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specify v/alues of v/ariables not found in the trace that initially
activated the recollection (pp. 49-50).
In Tesser's adaptation of Rumelhart's conceptual framework,
"generic concept" corresponds to the category of ev/ents subsumed under
the label a person assigns to an object of an attitude. In the "mere
thought" situation, the only piece of information derived directly from
sense data is the name of the object. Presumably, the first step in
thinking about the object is to retrieve the schema that is associated
u/ith the topic name and to instate this schema in working memory. At
that point the schema begins to direct the process of constructing a
representation of the topic, using the information that it already
incorporates and searching for additional information in long term
memory to fill in gaps. The information immediately available in
working memory upon instatement of the schema constitutes the salient
attributes lesser refers to in his first assumption, and the
information retrieved to fill in lacunae in the representation
constitutes the inferred attributes.
As mentioned above, traditional consistency theory (e.g., Heider,
1956; Festinger, 1957; Rosenberg & Abelson, I960) relied on a drive
reduction model to account for the occurrence of inconsistency reducing
cognitive and motor behavior in response to cognitive inconsistency.
Pepitone (1966) has noted that reliance on this model is unwarranted,
considering that numerous experiments in learning and motivation long
ago refuted the simple drive-reduction concept (Sheffield & Roby, 1950;
Olds & miner, 1954). A major advantage of Tesser's use of the schema
unotion to explain the tendency to reduce inconsistency is that it
dispenses i.ith the drive-reduction model. Instead of arousing
unpleasant sensations that prompt ameliorating responses, inconsistent
cognitiv/e elements fail to match schematic criteria for inclusion in
the representation of an object.
Because the validity of the schema notion remains an open question
among cognitiv/e psychologists, and the issue is tangential to the
present inquiry, no attempt to weigh the relevant evidence u/ill be made
here. The discussion so far has aimed only at stating and explaining
Tesser's assumption about the existence of schemas. The next two
sections take a more critical stance towards the assumptions that are
of central interest in the present investigation.
Evaluative Consistency
Where his first assumption posits the existence of cognitive
schemas that control thinking, Tesser's second assumption specifies
the impact that schema-directed thought will have on the schema's
constituent beliefs (i.e., cognitive elements). He asserts that
schematic processing will often result in a set of beliefs in working
memory that has "greater schematic and evaluative consistency." The
general tendency to greater schematic consistency does not, in itself,
provide a basis for the attitude polarization prediction. The putative
tendency toward greater evaluative consistency, on the other hand, when
joined with the third assumption that beliefs determine attitudes,
leads directly to the polarization hypothesis.
15
Defining "cognitive consistency" so that clear rules of
correspondence u,ith observable phenomena are specified has alu,ays been
a thorny problem for consistency theory (Pepitone, 1966). When, as in
Tesser's theory, consistency refers to a match betu/een schema and
cognitive element, the problem of definition is no less severe. The
myriad ways in which a piece of information might fit, or not fit, the
requirements of a particular schema are all but impossible to codify
neatly into a set of rules of correspondence. For practical purposes,
the judgement of whether a certain element is consistent or
inconsistent with a given schema must be made on an intuitive basis.
Although "schematic consistency" in the broad sense is not easily
operationalized, Tesser's derivation of the polarization hypothesis
depends on an assumption of a tendency to a more narrowly conceived
sort of consistency--evaluatiue consistency. A cognitive representa-
tion of an object displays absolute evaluative consistency when all of
the elements that compose it have either favorable or unfavorable
connotation. A representation displays evaluative inconsistency when
at least one element has the opposite evaluative connotation of the
preponderance of elements. Where overall schematic consistency in a
representation is hard to assess, evaluative consistency can be
measured in a number of ways (Sadler & Tesser, 1973; Kaplan, 1972).
The method used to measure evaluative consistency in the present study
is described in Chapter 6.
Limiting the discussion to evaluative consistency, is there any
empirical evidence that thinking actually tends to reduce evaluative
16
inconsistency? In impression formation research (Asch, 1946) it has
been found that subjects given a list of traits describing a fictional
person are likely to add neu, traits in their o^n descriptions of the
person. These new traits tend to be ev/aluatively consistent ujith the
prevailing evaluation in the list of traits. The finding suggests
that, at least in the context of impression formation, thinking does
tend to increase cognitive consistency. In addition, experiments
designed to test the cognitive balance theory of Abelson and Rosenberg
(1960) have demonstrated that, as a function of thought, "positively
evaluated entities become positively associated with other positively
evaluated entities and negatively associated (dissociated) with
negative entities; negatively evaluated entities become associated with
other negative entities" (Tesser, 1978 p. 295).
Tesser and his colleagues have provided their own evidence on the
issue of evaluative consistency as a function of thinking. Sadler and
Tesser's (1973) impression formation study of the polarization
hypothesis found that their subjects tended to list more evaluatively
consistent thoughts when given an opportunity to think, rather than a
distractor task, before thought listing. They found no difference in
the number of inconsistent cognitions, however. On the basis of these
results, Tesser argues that generation of consistent cognitions is the
primary mechanism by which thought reduces evaluative inconsistency,
and removal of inconsistent cognitions may play only a minor role
(Tesser, 1978 p. 313).
The present study failed to support the assumption that thinking
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about an object tends to produce a .ore e.aluatiwely consistent set of
cognitions in working „,emory. Instead, the data appear to support
precisely the opposite proposition, that thinking about an object will
tend to increase the number of inconsistent cognitions in working
memory. A full discussion of this result can be found in Chapters 8 and
9. It can be noted here, however, that the discrepancy in findings may
be related to differences in the respective experimental paradigms.
Specifically. thinking about a novel person in an impression formation
procedure may have substantially different results than thinking about
a familiar object in a strictly defined "mere thought" situation. This
point is elaborated in Chapter 4.
In summary, the available empirical evidence does not provide
unambiguous support for Tesser's assumption that thinking generally
reduces evaluative inconsistency. The assumption may be valid under
certain unspecified conditions. but appears invalid under the
conditions of the present study. Comparison of the studies that Tesser
cites in support of the assumption with the present study suggests that
its validity may be limited to cases where the object of thought is
novel
.
Beliefs Determine Attitudes
Tesser's third assumption that "attitudes are a function of one's
beliefs" (1978, p. 290) provides the crucial conceptual link between
thinking and feeling that implies the "mere thought" attitude
polarization hypothesis. If Tesser's first and second assumptions are
1 8
granted. disregarding any limitations they may have, then it is clear
that schema-directed thought frequently ought to produce a more
evyaluatively consistent set of beliefs about an object. If, as the
third assumption states, beliefs determine attitudes, then the more
ev/aluativ/ely consistent set of beliefs produced by thought should
produce attitude polarization. As Tesser argues, "Since thought tends
to make beliefs more evaluativ/ely consistent and attitudes are a
function of beliefs, thought will tend to polarize attitudes (1978, p.
290)
As noted earlier, the term attitude is defined here and by Tesser
as a person's affective evaluation (i.e. like or dislike) of a
particular object. The term belief refers to an element of a person's
cognitive representation of a given object that associates the object
with an attribute, or characteristic. An attribute's association to an
object can be either positive if the object is represented as
possessing the attribute, or negative if the object is represented as
not possessing the attribute. Each attribute carries an evaluative
connotation, that is, it implies something favorable or unfavorable
about an object to which it is associated. Thus, beliefs are said to
determine attitudes in the sense that they associate (or disassociate)
to objects desirable or undesirable attributes that determine the
person's like or dislike for the objects (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). A
more detailed discussion of these concepts can be found below in
Chapter 5.
An abundance of empirical evidence is consistent with the
19
contention that beliefs determine attitudes. The evidence can be
divided into at least three categories: 1. the nature of attitude
measurement techniques; 2. the results of correlational studies; and.
3. the results of attitude change studies.
Based on their comparative analysis of the various techniques that
investigators have used to develop attitude measurement scales,
Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) have put forward the follouiing
generalization: "All attitude scales derive a person's attitude from
his beliefs about the attitude object and the evaluations of the
associated attributes" (p. 83). For example, an attitude scale
developed by Thurstone's equal-appearing interval method (1931)
consists of a series of potential belief statements about some object
whose probable evaluative implications are known. A respondent
completing such a scale is asked to check all the statements with which
he or she agrees. The average evaluative implication of the statements
that the respondent believes (i.e. agrees with) serves as a measure of
the person's attitude toward the object. Other methods, such as
Likert's (1932) and Guttman's (1944), make similar use of potential
belief statements. The demonstrated utility of assessing a person's
belief or disbelief in statements linking an object to evaluated
attributes in order to infer the person's attitude toward the object is
consistent with the claim that beliefs determine attitudes.
Somewhat stronger support for the assumption can be found in
studies in which subjects' own belief statements are elicited, and
attitude scores based on these statements are correlated with scores
20
obtained by a standard method. In an early test of his expectancy
value model of attitude causation, Fishbein (1963) asked college
students to uirite douin the attributes that they associated u,ith black
people. Then, the students rated the ten most frequently listed
attributes on scales measuring the strength of their belief that blacks
possess a given attribute, and on scales measuring the fauorability or
unfavorability of the attribute. Scores calculated from these ratings
were correlated with the students' attitudes as measured directly by
semantic differential eualuativ/e scales (r = .80). The high positiwe
correlation between the own beliefs based measure and the direct
attitude measure, in Fishbein's original study and the many that have
followed it (see Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1981),
supports the supposition that beliefs determine attitudes. Of course,
the correlational nature of these studies still leaves open the
possibilities that attitudes cause beliefs, or a third factor causes
both
.
Attitude change studies employing thought-listing measures (Brock,
1967; Greenwald, 1968; Petty & Caccioppo, 1980) provide a third source
of relevant evidence. Using a wide range of treatments aimed at
changing subjects' attitudes, many investigators have demonstrated a
strong relation between post-treatment attitudes and the contents of
thought listing protocols obtained either during or immediately after
an influence attempt. For example, Harkins & Petty (1981) examined the
impact of varying the number of arguments and the number of different
sources presenting the arguments on college students' attitudes toward
21
requiring seniors to take a comprehensive exam. In a control
condition, the subjects were exposed to no arguments on the issue and
uiere simply asked to list their thoughts about it and to complete a
measure of their attitude toward comprehensive exams. The control
subjects reported negative attitudes and their protocols contained an
average of less than one favorable thought about the proposed
requirement. In the most effective persuasion condition, in which
three different speakers each presented a different argument in favor
of the proposal, subjects' reports of positive attitudes towards the
exams were accompanied by an average of almost four favorable thoughts
in their protocols. Overall, the mean attitude measured in each
condition in the study was highly correlated with the mean number of
favorable thoughts included in the thought listing protocols obtained
in the condition. (See Petty & Caccioppo, 1981 for a discussion of
other studies demonstrating the relation of self reported thoughts to
self reported attitudes.)
Taken together, a mass of empirical evidence is consistent with
the claim that a person's beliefs about some object determine the
person's attitude toward the object. However, even the experimental
demonstrations such as the one discussed above still leave some room
for other interpretations. In Fishbein & Ajzen's model of how beliefs
determine attitudes, it is the salient, or conscious beliefs that are
the proximal cause of a person's present conscious attitude toward an
object. Another possible explanation of the high evaluative
consistency of conscious beliefs and attitudes is that both are
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generated by the same unconscious representational processes. In other
uiords, the same unobservable processes that select one small subset of
all the information a person has about an object and make this
information salient may at the same time generate the person's
conscious attitude toward the object. This alternative v/ieu, u,ill not
be pursued further here, but is mentioned merely to point out a
difficulty in arguing that salient beliefs cause conscious attitudes on
the basis of self reports of the contents of consciousness. In u;hat
follows, the claim that "Attitudes are a function of one's beliefs"
(Tesser, 1978, p. 190) is accepted as a useful working assumption.
Summary
The theoretical roots of Tesser's "mere thought" attitude
polarization hypothesis have been explored in this chapter. Briefly,
Tesser argues that thought is controlled by cognitive schemas, that
schematic processing tends to make beliefs more eualuatiuely
consistent, and that attitudes are a function of beliefs. Given a more
evaluatively consistent set of conscious thoughts as a consequence of
thinking, it follows that thinking will often polarize attitudes. The
present discussion remained neutral on the issue of cognitive schemas,
rejected Tesser's claim that thinking tends to increase the evaluative
consistency of a person's thoughts, and tentatively accepted the
proposition that beliefs determine attitudes. The next chapter will
examine some of the empirical evidence that Tesser and his colleagues
have produced in support of the "mere thought" polarization hypothesis.
CHAPTER III
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE "^ERE THOUGHT" POLARIZATION HYPOTHESIS
The previous chapter examined the theoretical origins of Tesser's
"mere thought" attitude polarization hypothesis. In this chapter, the
empirical evidence that has been advanced in support of the hypothesis
is revieu/ed. Besides reporting the relevant findings, close attention
is paid to the details of the methods Tesser has employed. The
information presented here lays the groundwork for the conceptual and
methodological critique of the "mere thought" research that follou/s in
Chapter 4.
The "Likable" and "Dislikable" Other Person Study
The first study in which Tesser demonstrated an apparent
polarization effect examined the impact of thinking on subjects'
attitudes toward a stimulus person who presented himself in either a
positive or a negative manner (Sadler & Tesser, 1973). Subjects were
told that they were participating in a study of "how peers evaluate
each other without visual cues" (p. 103). Each subject spoke into a
microphone for two minutes, giving his or her opinion on one of
"several topics of current interest at the University of Georgia."
Then the subject listened to the comments of a supposed fellow subject
in another room, actually a tape recording. The comments either
complimented the subject's presentation in a pleasant way, or
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criticized the subject in an unpleasant >.ay. Then the subject uias
instructed either to read an irrelevant magazine article aloud for a
"standard woice pattern sample" (distraction condition), or, to think
about the other subject (thought condition). The thought or
distraction period went on for either 10 seconds, 1 minute, or 4
minutes, timed by the experimenter. At the conclusion of the timed
interval, the subject was asked to complete three measures of attitude
toward the "other subject": Byrne's Attraction Measure (Byrne & Nelson,
1965); three evaluative semantic differential scales (Osgood, Suci, &
Tannenbaum, 1957); and a paper and pencil thought listing and rating
measure (Brock, 1967; Greenu/ald, 1 968). The attitude measures were
administered in random order.
As expected, subjects formed positive impressions of the pleasant
other subject and negative impressions of the unpleasant subject. In
accord with the polarization hypothesis, the attitudes of subjects
given an opportunity to think before their attitudes were measured
were significantly more polarized than those of subjects who were
distracted. Subjects in the thought condition also listed more
cognitions consistent with their attitudes than those in the
distraction condition. There was no difference in the number of
inconsistent cognitions listed. Thus, the experiment seemed to support
Tesser's polarization hypothesis, and to supply some basis for the
assumption that thinking reduces evaluative inconsistency. The
hypothesis that polarization would increase with the length of time
spent thinking was not supported in this study, but, as is discussed in
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Chapter A, the negatiwe finding may be a result of a flaui in the
experiment's design.
The Effects of Time Spent Thinking Study
The second study that found a polarization effect (Tesser &
Conlee, 1975) initiated the use of the pre-posttest design that Tesser
later employed in the majority of his "mere thought" studies. Because
variation of time spent thinking did not have any systematic effect in
the first study, contrary to expectation, the purpose of the second
study was "to examine more closely the effects of time spent thinking"
(Tesser, 1978 p. 299).
In the first of the three experiments by Tesser and Conlee (1975),
each subject was exposed to seven opinion statements randomly selected
from a pool of 62 items. Taking each statement one at a time, the
subject first rated his or her agreement with the item, thought about
it for a timed interval, and then rerated the item on a scale identical
to the pretest scale. After completing this cycle for one statement,
the subject repeated it for each successive item until all seven items
were done. The length of time spent thinking was controlled by the
experimenter, who randomly assigned each subject to either a 30, 60,
90, or 180 second condition, and then timed the interval spent thinking
about each item. Subjects were given scratch paper on which they could
list their thoughts if they wished. Ratings were made in all cases by
marking the point on a 1 2 cm line drawn between "Strongly Agree" and
"Strongly Disagree", which most closely indicated the subject's own
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subjective probability that the statement
.as correct. Subjects
participated in groups of as many as four people.
The second experiment u^as similar to the first, except for three
aspects. First. the pretest uias given in a group session held a feiu
uieeks before the experiment. Subjects rated all 62 statements in the
item pool on the 12 cm agreement scale. Second. the eight items each
subject rated and thought about were selected on the basis of the
subject's pretest ratings. In order to avoid items tomard uihich the
subject had an extreme or neutral attitude, the eight items luere ones
that the subject had given moderate or loy positive or negative
ratings. The third difference uias the inclusion of a no thought
condition in luhich subjects made their posttest ratings immediately.
While the first two changes were essentially methodological refinements
aimed at eliminating cases where polarization cannot be measured (i.e.
extreme scores cannot get more extreme), the third change was intended
"to provide a test of the hypothesis that thought (regardless of
duration) produces greater polarization than no thought" (Tesser &
Conlee, 1975 p. 265).
As predicted, the percentage of the subjects' attitudes that
polarized increased as a function of time spent thinking, in both
experiments. However, the prediction that the lowest level of
polarization would be found in the no thought group was not borne out.
Instead, almost half of the no thought group's attitudes polarized; a
higher level of polarization than in all but the longest duration (180
second) thought groups.
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In response to what they call this "distressing" (p. 266) and
"anomalous result" (Tesser. 1978 p. 301), the authors conjectured that
perhaps listing one's thoughts exerts a depolarizing influence on atti-
tudes. They reasoned that subjects uiho wrote down their thoughts on
the scratch paper provided may hawe inferred that they might have to
defend their position later in the experiment. If so, the subjects may
have adopted a "strategy of moderation" (Cialdini, Levy, Herman &
Evenbeck, 1973), adjusting their posttest ratings toward the center of
the scale in order to present a more defensible posture to anyone who
might challenge their position. From this perspective, the low levels
of polarization in the thought groups can be viewed as the results of
the summations of a constant depolarizing force exerted by the thought
listing task with a series of polarizing forces increasing with time
spent thinking. In the no thought condition, on the other hand,
subjects did not list their thoughts, and so, the level of polarization
is a simple result of whatever polarizing forces were operating in the
no thought situation.
To test this logic, Tesser and Conlee (1975) conducted a third
experiment in which subjects did not list their thoughts during
thought intervals. Surprisingly, this experiment used an entirely new
set of stimuli and a different rating scale. Rather than reading
opinion statements, subjects viewed slides of news photos. Instead of
rating their agreement with the statements on a 12 cm scale, subjects
rated how pleasant or unpleasant the slides made them feel by touching
tylus to one of eight labeled screwheads arranged in a line (p. 267).a s
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In the pretest phase, the subject rated the pleasantness of 20
different photos. Then, each subject was shou>n a single photo for 10
seconds, half sa. a photo that he or she had giwen a moderate positive
rating, and half sau; a photo u/ith a moderate negative rating. At this
point, the subject u,as asked to fill out a four page questionnaire, but
to stop uiork and to think about the target photo luheneuer a THINK light
came on. The total time spent thinking luas varied from 0 to 28 to 90
seconds. The frequency of thinking was also manipulated by either
dividing the thought time into four equal lengths, or by not dividing
it. Subjects did not write down their thoughts, as they did in the
first two experiments, and in the initial "mere thought" study (Sadler
& lesser, 1973).
The results appear to support the hypothesis that polarization
increases as the amount of time spent thinking increases; in this
experiment the no thought group displayed the lowest level of
polarization. The expectation that the absence of thought listing
would increase the thought groups' overall level of polarization was
not fulfilled, however. Both the 28 second and 90 second thought
conditions resulted in less than half the subjects' attitudes
polarizing. The frequency of thinking manipulation had no significant
effect
.
Tesser and his colleagues have reported several other studies
(Sadler & Tesser, 1973; Tesser & Conlee, 1975; Tesser & Cowan, 1975}
Tesser 4 Leone, 1977; Tesser, 1976, 1978; Tesser i Danheiser, 1978;
Clary, Tesser, & Downing, 1978) that demonstrate a polarization effect
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of thinking. but as noted previously, the major objective of these
follo.-up studies has been to test hypotheses concerning factors that
may inhibit or facilitate the effect. The current investigation is not
concerned uiith testing the subsidiary hypotheses. so discussion of the
first two studies in the "mere thought" series is sufficient for
present purposes. The next chapter explores some of the conceptual and
methodological issues that the tu/o studies raise. and that the present
investigation has attempted to address.
CHAPTER lU
ISSUES ADDRESSED IN THE PRESENT STUDY
The two studies that u^ere summarized in Chapter 2 appear to
support the polarization hypothesis. This chapter presents a critique
of the methods used in these studies, and describes the features of
the present experimental investigation that are intended to ov/ercome
the problems identified here. Six major issues stand out, each of
which u/ill be discussed in turn. They are: (1) The use of target
objects that are nov/el to the subjects; (2) Faulty oper ationalization of
the "mere thought" situation; (3) The use of single item scales to
measure pre and post treatment attitudes; (4) Possible demand
characteristics of the instructions; (5) An inadequate procedure to
test the hypothesis that thought listing is depolarizing; and, (6) The
absence of controls for audience effects. The first and second
problems involwe conceptual issues, and the other four involve less
central methodological issues. Taken together, the objections raised
here constitute an argument that Tesser's "mere thought" attitude
polarization research has not produced valid empirical support for its
central hypothesis.
The Use of Novel Target Objects
Although Tesser has presented the "mere thought" hypothesis as a
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conjecture about attitude change, his actual studies involve attitude
formation. Rather than examining the effects of thinking on subjects'
already established attitudes tou-ard familiar objects, the "mere
thought" studies have typically observed the effects of thinking on
neuily formed attitudes tou-ard novel stimuli. The use of previously
unknown target objects prevents clear interpretation of the results of
these studies.
Because attitude formation does not occur instantaneously but
requires that time be spent constructing a cognitive representation of
the neui object (i.e. thinking) (Burnstein & Schul, 1982), the
polarization effects seen in the "mere thought" studies may be
artifactual. It is reasonable to assume that subjects' attitudes
toward objects that they have not yet encountered are neutral. Once a
novel object is presented, houiever, the subjects presumably begin to
construct a representation of it, and this representation may generate
a positive or negative attitude toward the object. The more time
subjects spend thinking about the object, the more beliefs about it may
be included in their representations.
If beliefs determine attitudes, then in many cases, the increasing
elaboration of the new representation as a function of time spent
thinking should result in increasingly polarized attitudes. Thus,
Tesser's demonstrations of attitude polarization as a function of
duration of thought can be explained as results of measuring attitudes
at successive phases during initial attitude formation. To avoid this
confound, a valid test of the "mere thought" attitude polarization
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hypothesis requires the use of familiar target objects towards which
subjects already have formed their attitudes.
Before discussing how the present investigation attempted to
resolwe this issue. it needs to be shown that the alternatiwe
explanation offered here is applicable to Tesser's findings. The
results of the two studies summarized in the preceding chapter (Sadler
4 Tesser. 1973; Tesser 4 Conlee, 1975) provide clearcut illustrations
of attitude polarization effects that can as readily be ascribed to
measurement at successive phases of early attitude formation as to the
influence of thinking per se.
The study by Sadler and Tesser (1973) is essentially an impression
formation study, not an attitude change study. Subjects encountered a
person they had not met previously, who presented himself in either a
pleasant or unpleasant manner. Control subjects in the timed
distraction groups were given little opportunity to form a cognitive
representation of the person, and subjects in the timed thought groups
were given the opportunity. That thought group subjects' attitudes
toward the stimulus person were more extreme than those of the
distraction group subjects, is entirely consistent with the alternative
explanation advanced here. In Tesser's explanation, the cognitive
representations of the distracted subjects are assumed to be less
consistent than those of the thought subjects. In the alternative
explanation, the representations of the distracted subjects are assumed
to be less elaborated. Thus, in the present interpretation, the
polarization effect that Sadler and Tesser observed is attributed to
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the .ere developed representations for.ed by the thought subjects
rather than to their more ev/aluatively consistent representations.
The thought-listing protocols that all the subjects produced
supply some empirical support for the proposed alternative explanation.
Distracted subjects listed significantly fewer thoughts about the
stimulus person than thought subjects (Sadler 4 Tesser, 1973 p. 106).
This result is clearly in line with the proposition that the
representations of the subjects who thought about the stimulus person
were more elaborated, as a consequence of thinking, than the
representations of the subjects who did not think about the person.
The study's finding that the length of time spent thinking about
the stimulus person was not related to the degree of attitude
polarization is apparently inconsistent with both Tesser's and the
present explanations. As Sadler and Tesser note, however, the method
of administering the dependent measures may have obscured the effects
of duration of thought (pp. 110-111). All subjects completed the
thought listing task, which permitted them "to take as much time as
they wanted" to think about the person and write down their thoughts.
Because the measures were administered in random order, many subjects
in all conditions were given an unmeasured amount of time to think
about the stimulus person before completing the attitude measures. Due
to this circumstance, no valid record of the duration of thought was
taken in many cases. Therefore, the negative finding about the
duration of thought is uninter pretable
.
The results of the three experiments in Tesser and Conlee's (1975)
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study each can be accounted for by either Tesser's or the present
explanation. The first t.o experiments. in .hich subjects thought
about statements that expressed particular opinions about various
social issues, do not refute the alternativ/e explanation, despite the
apparent use of familiar attitude objects. Although the social issues
that the statements referred to u/ere probably familiar to the subjects,
the statements themselwes mere probably not familiar. The
investigators instructed the subjects to think about the statements,
not about the issues themselves. The single item used to measure pre
and post treatment attitude required subjects to judge their agreement
or disagreement with the particular statement. That these judgements
tended to become more polarized the more time subjects spent thinking
about the statements is consistent with both the present view and
Tesser's. Tesser explains the finding as a consequence of the more
evaluatively consistent representations of the subjects uho thought
longer, and the alternative explanation accounts for it as the result
of their more developed representations.
Tesser and Conlee's third experiment provides a clearer example of
the use of novel attitude objects. The subjects rated how pleasant or
unpleasant each of a series of newsphotos made them feel. Even if some
of the subjects had previously seen some of the photos in their local
newspapers, it is likely that most of the photos were novel stimuli.
The increase in polarization of pleasantness ratings with increased
time spent thinking about a photo is susceptible to either Tesser's or
the alternative explanation.
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The three experiments reported belou, avoid the ambiguity inherent
in the use of novel attitude objects simply by using a familiar social
object instead: Professional football. Although subjects varied
considerably in their level of interest in this topic, it is reasonably
certain that all had been exposed to it frequently prior to their
arrival at the lab. and had already had an opportunity to form an
attitude. Besides its familiarity to the subjects, the topic conformed
to the criteria Tesser has set for target topics used in his studies.
A pilot study identified "Professional football" as a topic that
divided the subject pool roughly in half betu/een subjects u,ith positive
and negative attitudes. In addition, attitudes toward the topic tended
to be moderate or relatively neutral rather than extreme, in contrast
to topics like "The MX missile" that tended to elicit extreme attitude
ratings
.
Faulty Operationalizatlon of "Plere Thought"
Tesser's use of novel attitude objects in his "mere thought"
studies raises a second issue that presents another serious conceptual
difficulty. The studies failed to operationallze the "mere thought"
situation that they were designed to investigate. The essence of the
"mere thought" paradigm is that subjects be isolated from external
sources of information about the target object while they think about
it. The use of novel objects precludes the possibility that this
situation can actually be achieved. A "mere thought" experiment using
novel objects necessarily includes an external source of information
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about the objects, otherwise the.e can be no attitude to
.easu.e.
Presenting such information to a subjeot, and then removing it „hile
the subject thinks, clearly dop<;nnf =i • • i.i es ot eliminate the information's
directive influence on the subject's formation of a representation of
the topic. (The author
.ishes to thank Icek Aizen for noticing this
problem in the "mere thought" research.)
For example, the stimulus person in Sadler and Tesser's (1973)
experiment is heard to speak about himself and about the subject in a
Pleasant or unpleasant manner. Then, the subject thinks about .hat he
or she has just heard. To describe this situation as "mere thought" is
equivalent to claiming that reading a newspaper editorial about a
social issue and then closing your eyes to think about the issue is
"mere thought". Obviously, the contents of the editorial, and of the
stimulus person's communication, exert directive influence on the
supposedly isolated cognitive processes. The information present in
working memory, in both cases, is dra>.n directly from external and
internal sources. The external source suggests an appropriate
direction and intensity of the target attitude, and the internal
information may support or contradict the external source. That the
external source is inaccessible during the thought period does not
remove its influence on the representation the person forms. In the
true "mere thought" situation, all the information that enters working
memory and links evaluated attributes to the target object must be
retrieved from long term memory.
The target object used in the present study u/as professional
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football; the only piece of information concerning this object that .as
supplied to the subjects
.as the verbal sy.bol.
"Professional
football". By
.erely naming the topic, and saying nothing
.ore about
it. the experimental procedure .as a fairly close approximation of the
ideal "mere thought" situation. Rudimentary source and message
Characteristics could not be entirely removed from the situation, of
course. since the subjects did meet the experimenters, and the medium
of the computerized questionnaire may have influenced the subjects.
Overall, ho.ever, the present oper ationalization of "mere thought"
seems more adequate than has been used in previous research. (A
detailed discussion of the requirements of the "mere thought" situation
can be found in Chapter 5.)
The Use of Single Item Attitude measures
The tujo issues discussed above involve major conceptual problems
in the "mere thought" research. The remaining four issues are less
serious methodological shortcomings that obscure the interpretation of
Tesser's findings. but they are probably less important. Nonetheless,
the steps taken in the present research to circumvent these problems
represent methodological improvements in investigating "mere thought"
attitude change phenomena.
Tesser's studies typically use a single item to measure the
subject's attitude before and after the treatment period. The main
difficulty with using a single item for the pre and posttest is that
subjects are likely to recall their initial response when making the
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second one. To the extent that such recall ta.es place, the subject's
posttest rating ™ay be as influenced by his or her initial ratln, as by
the current state of the target attitude. Although Sadler and Tesser
(1973) used a ^ultiple-measure.ent approach, the single-item method
introduced in Tesser and Conlee (,975) presents problems for
interpreting their findings. Tssser's later studies share this
shortcoming
.
The pre and posttest attitude measures used in the three
experiments reported here consisted of ten evaluative semantic
differential scales (Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum, 1957). Three
aspects of the procedure uiere designed to interfere u,ith the subject's
recall of pretest responses at the time of the posttest. The pretest
ratings u/ere not made in isolation, but in the context of a series of
ratings, on the same ten scales, of twelve distractor topics. The
target topic was the seventh topic presented, in order to exploit the
primacy-recency effect (i.e. the beginning and end of a series of
memory items are more likely to be recalled than the middle items).
Finally, the scales themselves were presented in random order, so that
posttest ratings were made in a different order than the pretest
ratings. (See Baddeley, 1976 for a discussion of factors that disrupt
recall
.
)
Possible Demand Characteristics of the Instructions
A more problematic issue is raised by the instructions Tesser has
used to explain the thought task and the posttest ratings. These
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instructions appear too informative; they openly communicate the
expectation that attitudes may change during the experiment. Consider
the fono.ing excerpt from the initial instructions that subjects read
in Tesser and Conlee's (1975) first experiment:
"The important thing is that you think about the item until the
experimenter tells you to stop. At the experimenter's signal, reread
the item and then
... indicate on the scale provided
... the extent to
.hich you agree or disagree with the item at that particular moment.
Your attitude may or ™ay not completely agree .ith your past feelings,
but .e are interested only in your attitude at that particular moment."
(Emphasis added.) (Tesser & Conlee, 1975, p. 263)
These instructions have the likely effect of making attitude
change salient to the subject. Another example of overly informative
instructions is the follou/ing passage from Tesser and Conlee's (1975)
posttest instructions in their third experiment:
"I u/ould nou like you to once again indicate hou you feel about
the photograph that I shouted you before, since sometimes people's
feelings shift even over as short a period of time as this. Of course,
you may or may not feel the same way about the photographs. (Emphasis
added.) Just indicate how the photographs make you feel now" (Tesser &
Conlee, 1975 p. 268). In a footnote, the investigators described
additional sentences that they dropped, "since this instruction did not
have the desired effect and seemed to create too great a 'demand'"
(p. 268). The "desired effect" was described as "to increase the
overall rate of polarization." The instructions that the authors did
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include. ho.e„er, „ere
^^^^^^^^
Characteristics. Such con.unicati.e explanations to the subjects of
the experimental procedures makp rioa,- i r.*. j. ^.H Bu e clear interpretation of the findings
difficult.
The present study attempted to avoid the pitfall of demand
characteristics in the experimental procedure by two means. First, the
experiment was represented to the subject as a "Computerized Opinion
Study" that was "part of a study of people's opinions about a number of
topics of current interest and importance." The distractor topics
included items such as "Abortion" and "The m missile" that were
consistent with this pretext. Second, subjects were offered no
explanation for the thought task beyond referring to it as "part of
this experiment." The instructions for the posttest simply noted that
the subject had rated the topic previously and was asked to rate it
again. No reason for repeating the rating was given to the subject.
Invalid Test of Thought Listing Depolarization Hypothesis
As noted in the earlier discussion of their study, Tesser and
Conlee (1975) were distressed by the anomalous result that the subjects
in the no thought condition in their second experiment displayed a
higher rate of attitude polarization than all but the longest duration
thought group. Their response was to develop a post hoc explanation of
the finding revolving around the hypothesis that the thought listing
task may have a depolarizing effect. In their third experiment in
which subjects rated newsphotos, they eliminated the thought listing
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tas.. Because the no thought group in this experiment had the expected
lowest rate of polarization, they concluded that their post hoc
explanation had been supported.
Had they simply repeated their initial procedure in which subjects
were exposed to statements about social issues and made ratings on a
Single item agreement scale-without providing scratch paper during the
thought period-they
.ould have had some basis for this conclusion.
The experimental situation in the third experiment was radically
different from that in the first two. however. The attitude objects
u/ere newsphotos rather than opinion statements. Ratings of how
pleasant or unpleasant the photos made the subjects feel were made by
touching a labeled screwhead with a stylus, rather than by marking a
point on a line to indicate the subjective probability of a statement.
In short, too many independent variables were simultaneously changed in
the third experiment to draw any firm conclusion about the putative
depolarizing effect of thought listing. The third experiment is not
directly comparable with the first two.
lesser and Conlee were not primarily interested in their
depolarization hypothesis, so it is not surprising that they did not
subject it to a more valid test. The hypothesis that thought listing
has such an effect is important in its own right, however, and needs to
be tested empirically. Taking thought listing protocols from subjects
is a vital feature of the influential cognitive response approach to
studying attitude change (Brock, 1967; Greenwald, 1968; Petty and
Caccioppo, 1981). If this technique does in fact introduce a
42
systematic depolarizing bias into posttest «ffif hatt tude measurement,
investigator, employing It need to be auare of Its l„paot. Such an
effect uould also ha„e Implications for the theoretical understanding
Of attitude chenge In general. beyond purely nethodologlcal
considerations
.
In order to provide a more satisfactory test of lesser and
Conlee's (1975) depolarization by thought listing hypothesis, thought
listing u<as manipulated as an independent variable in the present
study. In each of the three experiments. a condition u,as included in
u/hich subjects listed their thoughts during the thought period. along
uiith tu/o other conditions in which subjects did not list their
thoughts. As 0,111 be seen in Chapter 7. the experiments produced
strong evidence in support of the depolarization hypothesis.
Neglect of Possible Audience Effects
The presence of other people has been shown to influence
individual behavior in many domains. Being observed by an audience
apparently may either inhibit or facilitate the performance of a task,
depending on how well learned the task is (Zajonc, 1965). Although
thinking is not directly observable, it is reasonable to conceive of
thought as cognitive performance (Bartlett, 1958). The possibility
that audience effects may occur In the domain of thinking cannot be
summarily dismissed. It might be expected that thinking about a
familiar object that the subject has thought about often in the past
would be facilitated by the presence of others, and that thinking about
43
an unfamiliar object uould ba Impeded.
Because Tesser „lews attitude polarization as a function of the
amount of thinking accompllsbed. It is apparent that possible audience
effects need to be controlled in the "mere thought" experimental
situation. Tesser's research program has neglected the possible
occurrence of audience effects on attitude polarization. I„the tuo
"mere thought" studies that ha„e been described here (Sadler * Tesser,
1973, Tesser S Conlee. ,975), the presence of others «,as „arled
some.hat haphazardly. The later studies in the "mere thought" series
that were not discussed in detail here also disregarded potential
audience effects.
The present investigation directly manipulated the audience
variable in an attempt to detect facilitating or inhibiting effects on
attitude polarization. In the first of the three experiments reported
here, subjects in all three conditions participated alone in a
soundproofed room during the entire course of the procedure. The
second experiment mas identical in all respects to the first, except
that the experimenter sat in the room with the subject and observed
quietly as the computer carried out the procedure. The largely negative
results of the manipulation of the audience variable are reported in
Chapter 7.
Summary
This chapter has completed the present review and critique of
Abraham Tesser's "mere thought" research program. The first two
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Chapters reviewed Tesser's derivation of the polarization hypothesis
and the empirical evidence he has put forward in its support. The
current chapter has argued that flaws in Tesser's methodology are
serious enough to invalidate the "mere thought" research program's
apparent empirical support for the polarization hypothesis. Six issues
clouding interpretation of Tesser's "mere thought" studies were
discussed. and the features of the present study designed to address
these issues were described. The first two issues, the use of novel
target objects and faulty operationalization of "mere thought", are
themselves sufficient grounds to reject the studies' results as
evidence of a polarization effect of thinking. The other four issues
could be regarded as more picayune, but are important enough to cast
some additional doubt on the validity of the "mere thought" research
findings.
In the remaining chapters, the discussion turns to the present
experimental investigation. The next chapter explicates the
theoretical orientation that guided the design of the experimental
procedures.. The rest of the thesis specifies the experimental
hypotheses and operational definitions of independent and dependent
variables, details the procedures followed, reports the results, and
concludes with a discussion of the findings and their implications.
CHAPTER v
A COGNITIVE nEOIflTION nODEL OF ATTITUDE CHANGE
in their^
People Play an actl„. In
attitudes. Workers in aff4f..^„ i.attitude Change research have provided extensive
evidence not only the valldlt. of this proposltlcn. hut ,or Us
central Importance. Effective persuasion producing enduring attitude
Change appears to depend on ho. successfuU. It Influences the internal
processes of self-persuasion (Kelman. ,S5S, igei; ^cGuire, 1.aO. ,9BS,
Petty
.
Caccloppo. ,se,,. Presenting a persuasive message to a person
can have little lasting l.pact unless it Instigates active cognitive
processes that resulf i* nt in changes In the person's oun cognitive
structure related to the topic of the message (Plshheln « Ajren. ,975).
The cognitive mediation frameuor. that has guided this
investigation of the attitude change phenomena that occur uithln
Tesser-s "mere thought" experimental paradigm is an amalgam of concepts
derived from tuo complementary models of attitude change. One, the
cognitive response approach, (Brock, ,967, Greenwald, ,968, Petty J
Cacioppo,
,96,) has stressed the critical role of the person's thoughts
during a persuasive communication in determining the Impact of the
message. The other, Fishbein and Ajzen's model of persuasive
communication (1975, ,981), has emphasized analysis of change in the
person's belief system regarding the topic of the message. Taken
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together, the two models conupv fho kvey the basic premises of the cognitive
mediation paradigm.
The cognitive response approach
.ill be considered first.
Researchers with this orientation assume "that .hen a person
anticipates or receives a persuasive communication, an attempt is made
to relate the information in the message (or the expected message) to
the preexisting knowledge that the person has about the topic" (Petty ,
Caccioppo, 1981, p. 225). The resulting
"self-generated cognitive
responses (thoughts) may agree with the proposals being made in the
message. disagree, or be entirely irrelevant to the communication".
The thoughts that the message elicits act as pro and counter arguments
that "determine the amount and direction of attitude change that is
produced .
"
There are five essential components of the cognitive response
model of persuasion, (1) an external source of information about a
topic; (2) an internal source of information about the topic in long
term memory; (3); cognitive processes that use available information
(a) to construct, in working memory, symbolic representations
concerning the topic and (b) to store new and revised representations
in long term memory; (4) the balance of pro and counterarguments in
working memory; and (5) the person's enduring attitude, or the general
evaluation of the topic stored in long term memory.
The persuasive communication process model of Fishbein and Ajzen
(1975, 1981) complements the cognitive response approach by supplying
an analysis of the relation to the information contained in a message
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of the cognitive structure that hcids the person's preexisting
knouledge about a topic. These authors Identify beliefs as the
fundamental units of cognitive structure, and distinguish dlfrerent
types of component beliefs by their functional relation to some
specific attitude, and by their correspondence to the Informational
items of the message.
A belief is defined as "the subjective probability of a relation
between the object of the belief and some other object, value, concept,
or attribute" (1975. p. 131). Not all beliefs a person may have about
an object directly determine the person's attitude toward the object;
those that do are termed the primary beliefs. Each proposition
contained in a message that asserts the probability that the object of
the attitude is related in some way to some attribute constitutes an
informational item. Each belief that asserts the person's own
subjective probability that an attribute specified in an informational
item is linked to an object is termed a proximal belief. Each belief
that asserts an object-attribute link that does not correspond to an
informational item in the message is termed an external belief.
A message will succeed in changing a person's attitude toward its
topic to the extent that it changes the person's primary beliefs. When
a primary belief is also a proximal belief, it can change directly if
the person accepts the corresponding discrepant informational item.
When a primary belief is an external belief, it can change indirectly
if the person infers a new subjective probability for the relevant
object-attribute link by considering the implications of the non-
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corresponding informational items.
The core of the Fishbein-A jzen model of the persuasion process is
their specification of the functional relation of the set of primary
beliefs to the attitude to.ard the object. First, it must be noted
that each attribute linked to an object by a primary belief is itself
linked to an evaluative judgement. Thus, each primary belief can be
characterized by its position on t.o quantitative dimensions: (1) the
subjective probability of the object's link to an attribute. or the
belief strength (b). and (2) the person's evaluation (e) of the
attribute linked to the object. According to Fishbein and Ajzen. the
follou/ing formula defines the functional relation betu/een the set of n
primary beliefs and the attitude toward the object (A):
n
b e
i=1
Within the constraints of this formula there are three ways in
which the set of primary beliefs can change and thereby change the
attitude: (1) the subjective probability that an object is associated
with an attribute can change; (2) the evaluation of the attribute can
change; and (3) a new belief can be added or subtracted from the set of
primary beliefs.
Figure la illustrates how the concepts of the cognitive response
approach and the Fishbein-A jzen model can be combined to represent a
general cognitive mediation paradigm for the persuasion process.
Figure lb shows how the "mere thought" attitude change process can be
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The first box in Figure 1, corresponds to the external source of
information, usually a .eesage. that both „odels require. Tuo types of
external factors are identified in the figure, (,) source and „easage
Characteristics (i.e. credibility, order of presentation, etc.), and
(2) the informaticnal Items contained in the message (shoun as the
object (X) linked to a particular attribute (a) and the evaluative
connotation of the attribute (e) communicated In the item). In Figure
1b, ..hich represents the "mere thought" experimental situation, the
first box is isolated from the rest of the process model by a dotted
line.
The theoretical significance of the 'We thought" situation is
analogous to the import of procedures that physiological psychologists
have used to demonstrate the internal neural source of wakefulness.
Early views (Bremer, 1937) postulated that wakefulness is driven by the
level of ambient stimulation confronting the organism. Later
researchers (Batini, et al., 1958, 1959) refuted the traditional
position by transecting a cat's brain at the midpons. Although the
sensory nerves were severed from the cerebral cortex, eliminating
sensory input, the cat exhibited total insomnia (Carlson, 1981).
Metaphorically then, Tesser's procedure can be viewed as a
"transection" of the persuasion process that "severs" the external
information source from the internal source and the constructive
cognitive processes. The demonstration of genuine attitude change in
this situation would provide strong evidence of an active internal
process of attitude change, independent of external influences.
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By comparing Figures 1a and 1b, it is possible to see .hat sort of
consequences the cognitive mediation paradigm indicates
.ould occur in
the "mere thought" situation. The first result concerns the nature of
the process of retrieving information from long term memory. depicted
m the second box in both figures. In the "intact" persuasion process,
multiple external probes instigate multiple searches in long term
memory. The source characteristics instigate searches for relevant
data; the topic of the message instigates a search for the primary
beliefs; and the informational items instigate searches for the
corresponding proximal beliefs, and for beliefs that support the
proximal beliefs. In the "transected" persuasion process, only a
single external probe - the name of the topic
-instigates a search
for the appropriate category label and primary beliefs.
The division of the long term memory box in both figures into
levels is meant to convey the concept that, if the name of the topic is
taken as the entry point into long term memory, all the information
stored there is located relatively "close" or "distant" from the
position of the initially activated information in the associative
network (cf. Collins & Quillian, 1967). As the figures shou/, the
intact persuasion process is likely to activate information that is
quite remote from the primary beliefs, but the transected process is
unlikely to activate remote information. The two situations prime two
very different sets of information in long term memory for entry into
working memory.
The cognitive response approach and the Fishbein- A jzen model both
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Identify working
.e.ory
.s the active site of attitude change. «s is
.ell knoun. „„kln, memory has a limited capacity; only about seven
lte.s can be salient at one ti™e (Mller. ,956). In the Intact
persuasion process, ™any pieces of information of both external and
internal origin compete uith each other for the fe. open slots.
.any
of these are irrelevant to the determination of the person's attitude
toward the topic, and others can affect the target attitude only if
they trigger an inference process that ultimately results in changes in
the primary beliefs.
The items that combine to represent the source and message can
directly determine the person's attitude to.ard the source and message,
but their influence on the target attitude, if any. is peripheral and
unlikely to produce lasting attitude change (Petty & Caccioppo. 1981.
1985). The salient informational items extracted from the message
contents can elicit retriev/al of pro and counterarguments from any
level of long term memory; they will influence the target attitude only
if they correspond to beliefs uhose change initiates an inference
process leading to the primary beliefs. Finally, the primary and
supporting beliefs may become salient in working memory if the
message's references to the target topic itself instigate their
retrieval from long term memory. In summary, the intact persuasion
process represented in Figure la is immensely complex, and does not
allouj clear differentiation of the impact of internal and external
influences on the target attitude.
In contrast to the inevitable confounding of external and internal
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influences on attitudec, in fh= t^t. j.tudes the intact persuasion process, the "mere
thought" situation depicted in Figure 1b all but eliminates external
factors. The only external information about the object that can enter
working memory is the topic name presented in the instructions to
think. The internal information most closely associated
.ith the
category label in long term memory has a clear field for entry into
working memory. As the figure sho.s, this information includes the
overall evaluation of the object (E) (i.e. the attitude), the primary
beliefs (L1) that have previously determined the attitude, and
possibly, some of the supporting beliefs (L2) on u;hich the primary
beliefs are based.
By entering working memory, the primary beliefs are made open to
the three sorts of changes specified in the Fishbein-A jzen model. The
cognitive response approach suggests the following mechanism of change.
The primary and supporting beliefs may act as pro or counterarguments
for each other, or their presence in uorking memory may instigate
searches for more remote pro and counterarguments, or for information
that can be used in constructing new arguments. If the global
evaluation of the object represented in working memory diverges from
the initially retrieved attitude as a result of this pro and
counterargumentation
,
the person's current perception of the attitude
will also shift. If the revised evaluation is then stored in long term
memory, this attitude change will endure.
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Application of the Plodel in the Present Study
The design of the three experiments reported here .as guided by
the conceptualization of the "mere thought" situation depicted in
Figure 1b. Every effort
.as made to bring about as complete an
isolation from external influences on the attitude change process as
possible. As has been mentioned above in Chapter 3, subjects .ere
exposed only to the name of a familiar topic, "Professional football",
and no attributes of the topic .ere stated at any point in the
procedure. In addition, the use of a microcomputer to carry out the
experimental procedure virtually eliminated the external influence on
the attitude change process of an experimenter's facial expression,
tone of voice, posture. etc. In the audience conditions potential
experimenter effects .ere minimized by keeping the experimenter blind
to the treatment condition. All in all. the experimental situation
used in the present investigation is as close an approximation of the
situation sho.n in Figure lb as could be devised.
Besides guiding the development of an experimental procedure, the
model of the "mere thought" situation advanced here implies that it is
reasonable to predict attitude change in the absence of external
influence. The model does not make a directional prediction (e.g.
attitude polarization or depolarization). but does provide a
theoretical basis for expecting some sort of attitude change as a
result of thinking. In contrast to the complex impact of an external
message on the contents of .orking memory, the "mere thought" situation
appears to have the simple effect of instigating the retrieval of the
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attitude and primary beliefs. Because, according to the Fishbeln-A jzen
.nodel. the primary beliefs determine attitudes. and are determined
themselves by constructiwe processes in working memory. the "mere
thought" situation seems able to produce conditions in which attitude
change is likely. The cognitive response approach concept of pro and
counterargumentation provides the potential mechanism of change. The
experiments reported here are tests of the overall validity of the
cognitive mediation model of attitude change.
Summary
This chapter has presented the theoretical underpinnings of the
present investigation. A cognitive mediation model of the general
attitude change process was developed by combining elements of the
cognitive response approach (Brock. 1967; Greenwald, 1968; Petty &
Caccioppo, 1981) with elements of the Fishbein-A jzen model of the
persuasion process. A specific model of the "mere thought" attitude
change process was derived from the general model. Finally, the
influence of the model on the present study was discussed.
Essentially, it was stated that the experimental procedures followed
here were an attempt to operationalize the conceptual model of "mere
thought", and that the model's prediction of attitude change as a
result of "mere thought" requires the test that the present
investigation provides. The next chapter contains the experimental
hypotheses tested here, and operational definitions of the relevant
dependent variables.
CHAPTER u I
HYPOTHESES AND OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS
The series of three experiments reported here provided tests of
seven hypotheses. In this chapter. each of the hypotheses is stated
along with its rationale. and operational definitions of the relevant
dependent variables are given. The manner in which the independent
variables were operationalized is detailed in the next chapter's
description of the experimental procedures.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: "...Thought about some object in the absence of any new
information will tend to produce attitude polarization."
(Tesser. 1978 p. 298)
^i£iiai£5 Chapter 2 discussed Tesser's derivation of the polarization
hypothesis in some detail, so little need be added here. Tesser has
summed up his argument as follows:
"People have organized knowledge structures called schemas.
During thought schemas make some beliefs salient and provide rules
for making inferences. Schema-directed thought tends to result in
a set of cognitions more consistent with the schema and also more
evaluatively consistent. Since affect is dependent on salient
cognitions, this greater evaluative consistency leads to attitude
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polarization." (Tesser, 1978 p. 297)
Hypothesis 2: Thinking about an obiect in fh»ject t e absence of new informa-
tion will tend to produce attitude depolarization.
Rationale: An argument leading to this prediction. the opposite of
Tessar's polarization hypothesis.
.as outlined in the Introduction.
Like the polarization hypothesis. the depolarization hypothesis rests
on three assumptions. First. rather than assuming that thinking is
controlled by cognitiwe schemas. it is assumed that, whatever mechanism
controls the process. thinking generally serves the function of
adapting a person's internal representation of his or her situation in
the environment to greater congruence with the real external situation.
In the case of a person thinking about a single external object,
thinking is assumed to result in a representation that is more
weridical in the sense that it provides the person with a more accurate
view of the object's motivational significance.
Second. it is assumed that the cognitive representation of an
object that is formed immediately upon encountering the object, either
symbolically or actually, will be more evaluatively consistent than the
representation resulting from continued thinking about the object. In
other words, a person's initial thoughts about something are likely to
be contradicted by "second thoughts" if the person continues thinking.
The process of counterposing evaluatively inconsistent thoughts can
potentially improve the veridicality of representation, the task that
the first assumption posits as the function of thinking.
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The third assumption is the same as Tesser's: The person's current
cognitive representation of an object determines the person's attitude
towards the object. Granting these three assumptions. it follows that
the initial attitude toward an object upon encountering it is likely to
be more polarized than the attitude after time spent thinking.
Hypothesis 3, Thinking about an object in the absence of new
information will tend to result in attitude change.
Rationale: The discussion of the cognitive mediation model of attitude
change in the preceding chapter gave the basis for this non-directional
prediction. If attitude change occurs as a consequence of cognitive
processes in working memory that affect the set of primary beliefs that
determine a particular attitude. the "mere thought" situation should
have the potential to produce attitude change. In the absence of new
externally supplied information about the attributes of the attitude
object, the primary beliefs face little competition for entry into
working memory. When these beliefs do enter working memory, they
themselves can act as probes into long term memory that may elicit the
retrieval or construction of pro or counterarguments. As the process of
argumentation in working memory proceeds, the initial set of primary
beliefs may change, leading to change in the person's attitude.
Hypothesis 4i Thinking about an object in the absence of new informa-
tion will tend to increase evaluative consistency in its
representation in working memory.
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polarization hypothesis. As sho„„ in Chapter
, , tha source of this
proposition Is in consistanoy theory. „hioh posits that incohsiatant
cognitions produce an unpleasant dri„a state that motivates a person to
reduce the inconsistency by either overt or co„art behavior. Tesser
appears to have rejected the drive-reduction notion of traditional
consistency theory. but his appeal to the concept of cognitive scha.as
has permitted hi. to retain the assumption of a tendency towards
evaluative consistency. m his view, sche.a-directed thought is a
process of assessing the .atch between the contents of working
.e.ory
and the scha.a. and of retaining the cognitive elements that most
closely conform to the schema.
Hypothesis 5, Thinking about an object in the absence of neu,
information ujill tend to reduce evaluative consistency
in its representation in working memory.
Rationale: This hypothesis. u/hich contradicts Tesser's evaluative
consistency assumption, is assumed in the present derivation of a
depolarization hypothesis about the effects of thinking on attitude.
It is no more self-evident than Tesser's opposing hypothesis, hou/ever,
and needs to be supported by evidence.
If it is accepted that thinking serves the biological function of
adapting human beings to their environment, and that it does so by
providing people with more or less veridical representations of their
situations, then it is reasonable to posit that the evaluative
consistency of a representation is likely to decrease as thinking
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proceeds. The initial reoresentaf i or, p
" or an object that first comes to
mind u/hen a person encounters the obiert r = n hun Dj c ca be uieiued as a first
approximation model of the ohiprf « • ^.Object s motivational significance that can
permit the person to take immediate action, if the situation requires
it. As a first approximation, the initial representation may include
only the most outstanding aspects of the person's knowledge about the
object. and these aspects are likelv t-n h., - ^H i> y o be consistently negative or
positive in their evaluation.
Given enough time to think about the object. on the other hand,
the person is likely to form a more finely detailed representation that
includes knouiledge about the object that has the opposite evaluative
connotation to the knowledge embodied in the initial representation.
Should action be required after the person has had the opportunity to
construct a more veridical representation of the object. the person
may be able to fine tune the course of his or her behavior touiards the
accomplishment of more adaptive consequences than the first
approximation may have permitted.
In the context of the "mere thought" paradigm. the object's
presence is only symbolic. and the person clearly has the opportunity
to think without taking immediate action. Therefore. the present
reasoning leads to the prediction that the final representations of
objects that subjects form in this experimental situation are likely to
be less evaluatively consistent than their initial representations.
Hypothesis 6: Writing down thoughts about an object in the absence of
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any new information will tpnri f„i"i-LX end to produce attitude
depolarization.
estionSie: The prediction that listing thoughts about an object in
-ritlng „lll ten. to depolarize a person's attitude can be derived fro.
at least t.o lines of reasoning. First, Tesser has argued (Tesser .
Conlee. 1975, Tesser, 1978) that thought listing is ll.ely to alert
subjects to the possibility that they
.Ight have to defend their o„n
vie„s against opposing vleu,s. If so, then subjects n,ight be expected
to adopt a "strategy of moderation" (Cialdlni, et al.. 1973) in
completing a post thought listing attitude measure. By presenting
their attitudes as "middle of the road", subjects assume a posture that
can more easily be defended against an opponent than a more extreme
position
.
A second argument can be derived from the present cognitive
mediation model of attitude change. When a subject has constructed and
externalized a verbal representation of a belief about an object, the
written statement acts as an external probe that elicits the retrieval
or generation of counterarguments. In other words, once a statement
has been written, the subject is likely to engage in a process of
checking the statement's validity by scanning long term memory for
contradictory data. (Implicit in this view is the assumption that the
process of checking the validity of a statement will entail a
preferential search for disconf irming rather than confirming evidence.)
As counterarguments are retrieved or are constructed in working memory,
they will often result in changes in the set of primary beliefs
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may
ey may
associated uiith the attitude object Th.uu . e counterarguments
thsmsal„es be incorporated into the set of primary beliefs, or tb
-a.en tbe initial primary beliefs, or oban.e the attribute evaluations
Of the beliefs. If the primary beliefs determine attitude, then the
result of such changes in the primary beliefs
.ill be attitude
depolarization.
Hypothesis 7, The presence of an audience during thought about an
object »ill tend to either facilitate or impede
attitude polarization.
Rationale: This prediction is based on the findings of social
facilitation research (e.g. Zajonc. 1965). The presence of an audience
appears to have either a facilitating or impeding effect on the
performance of a behavior. When the behavior is a familiar,
.ell
learned one, an audience is likely to facilitate performance, but u;hen
the behavior is neui or poorly learned, an audience is likely to impede
performance. Thinking, although a covert form of behavior, ought to be
subject to the same kind of audience effects that have been shown to
influence overt behaviors. Following Tesser's argument that thinking
is likely to produce attitude polarization, the presence of others can
be expected to increase polarization when subjects think about a
familiar object, and to decrease polarization when they think about an
unfamiliar object. That is, thinking about a familiar object is a well
learned task that ought to be facilitated by an audience, and thinking
about an unfamiliar object is a relatively novel task that ought to be
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inhibited.
Operational Definitions of Dependent Variables
Attitudinal variables. The operational definitions of absolute
attitude change. attitude polarization, and attitude depolarization
that are used in this study are based on comparison of pre and post
treatment evaluative semantic differential scores (Osgood. Suci. &
Tannenbaum. 1957; Fishbein. 1963). The pre and posttest scores are
calculated by summing the ratings on ten seven-place evaluative scales
ranging in value from -3 to .3. The scores can range from -30 to *30.
1- Absolute attitude, change: The absolute value of the difference
betuieen the pretreatment (SD1) and posttreatment (SD2) semantic
differential scores.
Absolute attitude change = SD1 - SD2
2. Attitude polariz ation ; When SD2 has the same sign (+ or -) as SD1
,
and the absolute value of SD2 is greater than that of SD1
.
the attitude
is said to have polarized. If SD1 is equal to zero, and SD2 is not
equal to zero. the attitude is also said to have polarized. Attitude
polarization can be scored in a number of ways, three of which are used
here (See Tesser. 1978 for discussion of scoring methods.):
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a) Percentage Of subjects polari.ed: Th. nu.ber of subjects In each
treatment group uhose attitudes have polarized according to the above
criteria is determined, and the percentage of subjects polarized In
each group is computed.
b) Absolute polarization score: If a subject's attitude has polarized
then the absolute polarization score equals the absolute value of the
difference between SD1 and SD2. If the subject's attitude has not
Changed, or has depolarized (see belou). the absolute polarization
score equals zero.
c) Degree of polarization score: If a subject's attitude has polarized
then the degree of polarization score equals the absolute polarization
score. If the subject's attitude has depolarized, the degree of
polarization score equals the absolute depolarization score multiplied
by -1
.
^' Miilil^e depolarization : When the sign of SD2 is opposite that of
SD1
,
or if the absolute value of SD2 is less than the absolute value of
SD1
,
the attitude is said to have depolarized. Attitude depolarization
is scored here by the same three methods used to score polarization.
a) Percentage of subjects depolarized; Instead of computing the
percentage of subjects polarized in each group, the percentage
depolarized is computed.
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b) Absolute depola.i.atl^n score: „ , subject's atutuds has
depolarized, the absolute depolarization score e.uals the absolute
value Of the difference between SD, and S02. If the subject's attitude
has not Changed, or has polarized, then the absolute depolarization
score equals zero.
c) Degree of polarization score: Same method used to score both
polarization and depolarization.
4. No attitude change: When SD1 is equal to SD2, the attitude is said
to have shown no change.
Pleasures of evaluativ/e meaning and evaluative consistency. Subjects in
all conditions of the experiments described in the next chapter
completed thought listing procedures in uihich they first typed each
thought about the target topic "Professional football" that arose
during a three minute interval. They then u,ent on to rate their
statements on subjective probability and evaluative implication scales
(Fishbein & Raven, 1963). The attempts to quantify temporal trends in
evaluative meaning that are described next are all calculated on the
basis of the subjects' own ratings of their statements. A detailed
description of the thought listing and rating task itself can be found
in the next chapter and in Appendix A.
66
Te^por.l t.snd .cores: subject, listed their thoughts ,.out the
target topic, the tempore! order of the statements „as recorded in the
thought listing protocols. By comparing the subjects' initial thoughts
»ith their later thoughts. it is possible to test the opposing
hypotheses that thoughts will become slth.,o ei er more eualuatiuoly
consistent or less e.aluatively consistent as thinking proceeds. To
obtain the scores described below. each subject's thought listing
protocol was first divided into a first and second half. if, f„
example, a subject made ten statements about the topic, the first half
of the protocol consisted of the initial five sentences and the second
half consisted of the final five sentences. If a subject produced an
odd number of statements. the ratings of the middle statement were
divided evenly between the two halves of the protocol. Four types of
scores were computed for each half of a protocol: total affect,
consistent affect, inconsistent affect, and proportion of consistent
affect
.
Total affect scores: As noted previously, the subjects rated each of
their statements on subjective probability and on evaluative
implication scales. The product of the two ratings for a sentence is
taken as an index of the positive or negative affect expressed in the
sentence, and the absolute value of the product represents the
intensity, disregarding the direction, of the expressed affect. The
total affect expressed in each half of a protocol consists of the sum
of the absolute values of the products of the ratings of the sentences
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in that half.
2) Consistent and inconsistent affect scores: m general, t.o
approaches can be ta.en to determining whether to define the positive
or negati.e affect a subject expresses as the attitude consistent
affect. The first
.ould be to use a separate index of the e.aluati.e
direction of a person's attitude, such as the semantic differential
pretest score in the present study. to identify the consistent
direction. Thus. if the pretest indicated that a subject had a
positiwe attitude. the positive statements in the protocol
.ould be
taken as the consistent statements. Ho.ewer. in attempting to apply
this approach in the present investigation. a major difficulty arose.
The predominant affect expressed in the protocols of a large minority
of subjects, especially those .ith very lo. positiwe or negative
pretest scores. u,as the opposite of the direction indicated by their
pretest scores. For example. a subject u,ith a pretest score of -5
might express predominantly positiwe beliefs about the target topic in
his or her thought listing protocol. In such cases, the ewaluatiwe
direction indicated in the pretest score apparently is in error--the
subject actually seems to hawe a slightly positiwe attitude tou/ard
"Professional football". Consistent affect scores based on this
external approach therefore appear highly prone to error, and a
different approach is adopted here.
This second approach relies on a composite index of the consistent
ewaluatiwe direction. Three attitude scores were transformed and
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combined to produce this Index: the potest score, the "oun beliefs"
ecore based on the first half of the protocol, and the o„n beliefs
score based on the „hols protocol. The „„n beliefs scores „ere
calculated by su„ing the crossprcducts of the subject's evaluative and
belief strength ratings of his or her sentences, the first half score
based on the sentences in the first half, and the other based on both
halves taken together. THp fhT. = r.Bi:ne he three scores for each subject were
transformed either to +1 or -i Har, = r,^- i., .+1
-1, depending on their signs, and the
transformed scores u^ere summed to form the composite index. If the
index .as negative, the subject's initial attitude was assumed to be
negative, and if positive, the attitude was assumed to be positive.
For the first half of a protocol, the absolute value of the
sum of the products of the ratings of the statements in the attitude
consistent direction is taken as the consistent affect score. The
inconsistent affect score is defined as the absolute value of the sum
of the products of the ratings of the statements in the inconsistent
direction. The same method is used to calculate the second half
scores.
Total affect expressed in each half of a protocol is related to
consistent and inconsistent affect as follows: Total affect =
consistent affect + inconsistent affect. If the methods used to
calculate these scores remain unclear, it may be helpful to examine the
sample thought listing protocol included in Appendix A.
3) Proportion of consistent affect scores: The proportion of
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consistent affect expressed in t.e fi.st or seccnd
.alf of a p.otocoi
is define, as the .atio of the consistent affect aco.e to the totai
affect score for that half. ,s „ill ,e seen heiou. comparison of these
scores in the first and second half of subjects' protocols provides
evidence that is directly relevant to Hypotheses 4 and 5.
Summary
This chapter has presented the hypotheses tested in the present
investigation. and has provided operational definitions of the
dependent variables of interest here. Hypotheses 1. 2. 3, 6, and 7 are
predictions about attitude change in the "mere thought" situation, and
Hypotheses 4 and 5 are predictions about change in the evaluative
consistency of the contents of uiorking memory as a function of time
spent in "mere thought".
Hypothesis 1, Tesser's "mere thought" attitude polarization
hypothesis, stands in opposition to Hypothesis 2, the present "mere
thought" attitude depolarization hypothesis. Similarly, Hypothesis 4
is Tesser's prediction that the representation of an object in working
memory should become more evaluatively consistent the longer a person
thinks about it, and Hypothesis 5 is the opposite prediction that
evaluative consistency will decrease the longer a person thinks about a
topic.
The dependent measures described above fall into two categories
parallel to the two categories of hypotheses. Measures used to test
the attitude change and polarization hypotheses include absolute
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attitude Change scores. Percentage polarization and depolarization
scores, degree of polarization scores, and absolute polarization and
depolarization scores. These scores are all based on the difference
between subjects' pretest evaluative semantic differential scores
towards the target topic
-Professional football" and their posttest
scores. A set of temporal trend scores consisting of total affect
scores, consistent affect scores, inconsistent affect scores, and
proportion of consistent affect score, is used to test the evaluative
consistency hypotheses. These measures are all calculated on the basis
of subjects' own ratings of their own staterents produced during the
thought listing task.
CHAPTER Mil
METHOD
Three experiments
.ere performed in order to test the hypotheses
put forward in the preceding chapter. Their design is modeled on
Tesser's pre-posttest experimental paradigm. Experiments 1 and 2
fenced identical procedures, except that subjects participated alone
in the former, and in the presence of the experimenter in the latter.
First, all subjects rated their attitudes to.ard a series of distractor
and target topics on ten ewaluativ/e semantic differential scales.
Then, the subjects u,ere randomly assigned to one of three groups: a
Distraction group; a Thought group; and a Thought Listing group.
Immediately after the treatment condition, they repeated the ten
semantic differential ratings of the target topic. Follouiing the
posttest, subjects completed listing and rating their thoughts about
the target topic, and completed a modal salient beliefs measure of
their attitudes, which is described belom. The three groups in each of
the two experiments combine to form a 3 X 2 ANOVA design.
In the course of carrying out the initial two experiments, the
need for a third experiment to clarify certain ambiguities became
evident. The measures of evaluative consistency used here require
subjects to list their thoughts and rate them on subjective probability
and evaluative scales. In the case of the Thought Listing treatment
group, subjects listed their thoughts prior to the posttest. But
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subjects in the Distraction and Thought groups listed their thoughts
after the posttest. Thus. the levels of evaluative consistency
Observed in the Thought and Distraction groups could be as affected by
the posttest as by the treatments. To remove this potential confound,
the third experiment administered the posttest after thought listing in
all three groups. In all other respects. Experiment 3 .as identical to
Experiment 1; the experimenter uas not present
.hile the procedure .as
in progress. The Thought Listing group in Experiment 3 .ent through
precisely the same procedure as Experiment 1's Thought Listing group.
Because all three experiments followed highly similar procedures,
only the procedure used in Experiment 1 is fully elaborated here. The
description of the methods used in Experiments 2 and 3 is limited to
the features that distinguish them from the method of Experiment 1.
Experiment 1 : No Audience
Subjects
Ninety undergraduates enrolled in psychology courses at the
University of Massachusetts participated in the first experiment;
26 males and 6A females. All participants were recruited through the
psychology department's subject pool, an arrangement in which students
receive partial credit in department courses in return for their
voluntary cooperation. Each subject was randomly assigned to one of
three conditions; 30 subjects were included in each group.
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Apparatus
A Kaypro 4 portabls microcomputer „a= used to conduct the antlra
experi.snt.1 procedure. The machine is a aelf contained unit .ith 6«
Rfl-1. t.o 360K disk drives, and a nine inch monochrome display screen.
The program that executed the procedure „as written in Microsoft Basic.
Procedure
Figure 2 is a diagram of the procedures employed in the three
conditions of the experiment. As can be seen, subjects in all three
conditions u<ent through the same tuio initial stages. First, they read
general instructions and then. they completed a pretest in uihich they
rated their attitudes towards thirteen topics, including "Professional
football", the target topic.
In the third stage, after random assignment to condition, subjects
received one of three treatments: Distraction, Thought, or Thought
Listing. After the three minute treatment period, all subjects
completed a post test of their attitudes toward the target topic.
Subjects in the Thought Listing group rated their statements of their
thoughts on subjective probability and evaluative scales immediately
after the posttest, and subjects in the other two groups made their
ratings when they completed listing their thoughts. In all three
conditions, the subjects completed a final measurement of their
attitudes toward the target topic by rating 20 modal belief statements
that were obtained in a pilot study.
A more detailed description of each stage in the procedure
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follows. Appendix A contains a printout of thpM e sequence of screen
displays seen by the subjects in all three conditions.
instructions. The experimenter showed each subject into a soundproofed
TOO. Where the
.icroco.puter was set up on a table. Then, the
experimenter showed the subject how to start the machine.
.hen it was
Clear that the subject understood what he or she was to do. the
experimenter left the room and shut the soundproofed door. The first
instructions displayed on the screen were as follows:
"This experiment is part of a study of people's opinions about a
number of issues of current interest and importance. Thank you for
agreeing to participate. The purpose of the experiment is to find out
.hat YOU THINK about the topics. There are no right or wrong answers
to the questions you will be asked to respond to here. Always select a
response to a question which best states YOUR OWN OPINION on the
topic."
Before proceeding any further, each subject typed in answers to
four demographic questions: age, gender, academic major, and expected
year of graduation. Then the subject went on to read the instructions
for the pretest. (See Appendix A.)
Pretest. The pretest phase required the subject to rate each of
thirteen topics on ten eualuatiue semantic differential scales (Osgood,
Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957; Fishbein & Rauen, 1963; Fishbein & Ajzen,
1975). The topics were presented in the same order for each subject.
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The
"ith the target topic
"Professional foottall" presented seventh,
target topic xas P-sontsd in the „i..le of the list of dlstractor
topics m order to ™inl.i.e the li.eUHood that the subject „„.ld
recall His or her previous responses
.hUe ta.in, the posttest. The
semantic differential
-lee „ere presented in random order for each
topic, also to .inl^ize recall, m addition to recording the subject's
scale rating, the computer also recorded the response latency fro™ the
presentation of a scale and topic until the rating.
The thirteen topics, in the order in uhich they
.ere presented,
uere. TV commercials, Daycare, Abstract art, Capital punishment,
National health insurance, The « missile. Professional football. Space
exploration, Labor unions, Ronald Reagan,
.alter «ondale, A nuclear
freeze; and Abortion.
Treatments. After completing the pretest, each subject u,as randomly
assigned to one of three conditions. Then. the subject read the
appropriate instructions for his or her group.
1. Distraction condition. Subjects in this group were instructed to
think about the distractor topic "Abstract art" for a three minute
period. No explanation was given of the purpose of the thought period.
The topic was displayed on the screen for three minutes, and the
subject then proceeded to the posttest.
The instructions were as follows:
"This part of the experiment will focus on a single one of the
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topics Which you
.neountered in the fi„t part. v.u as.eP to t,.e
three minutes to ,i„e serious thought and reflection to the topic.
During this three minute period of thought, it la important that you do
THE THOUGHT PERIOD UILL BEGIN yHEN VOU PRESS RETURN TO CONTINUE.
AND THE TOPIC IS OISPLAYEO ON THE SCREEN.
, .,„er „iu sound when th.
three minutes are up."
2. Thought condition. These subjects received exactly the sa.e
instructions as the distraction group, but the target topic-
"Professional football"-.as displayed on the screen for three minutes.
The subjects then went on to the posttest.
3. Thought Listing condition. Instead of simply thinking about the
target topic, subjects in this group uiere asked to type into the
computer each thought about the topic that occurred to them. The
target topic was displayed on the screen followed by an ellipsis (i.e.
Professional football...), and the subject recorded a thought by typing
a complete sentence beginning with "Professional football". As the
subject typed, his or her words were displayed on the screen. When the
subject ended a sentence with a period, the screen cleared and the
target topic was again displayed to elicit the next sentence
completion. The computer recorded the completed sentences, and the
response latency in milliseconds between each initial display of the
topic and the first letter of the first word of the sentence
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completion. The time to type the spnfone te ce mas recorded in 1/1 00s of a
second
.
The complete instructions f„. the thought listing tas. are
included in Appendix A.
Dependent Measures. At the conclusion of the treatment phase of the
procedure, all subjects completed a series of dependent measures
intended to detect the impact of the treatments on the subjects'
attitudes toward the target topic.
1. Posttest. I-n-ediately after completing their treatment tasks, all
subjects proceeded to the posttest phase of the experiment. They rated
the target topic on the same ten evaluative semantic differential
scales used in the pretest, but in a different random order.
2. Thought listing. Subjects in the Distraction and Thought groups
then went on to complete the same thought listing task that the
Thought Listing group did as an experimental treatment.
3. Thought rating. All subjects rated each of the statements that they
had made during their thought listing periods on two scales: 1. a
seven-place subjective probability scale ranging from EXTREMELY LIKELY
to EXTREMELY UNLIKELY and; 2. a seven-place evaluative semantic
differential scale ranging from EXTREMELY GOOD to EXTREMELY BAD. The
subjects were instructed to indicate with the first rating how strongly
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they believed t.e statement.
„uh the second
.atln,. „
"bad" „as the state.enfs l.pXled evaluation of the target topic. The
computer recorded the ratinqs and thoT.ing e rating response latencies. The
instructions for these ratings can be found in Appendix A.
^. .odal salient belief scales. The final phase of the experiment
required subjects in all three groups to complete an attitude scale
consisting of twenty belief statements about the target topic. The
items .ere selected on the basis of the results of a pilot study of the
computerized thought listing procedure in which respondents listed
their thoughts on nine topics, including the target topic. The ten
most frequently stated negative beliefs, and the ten most frequent
positive beliefs that were elicited in the pilot study were included in
the modal salient belief scale (Fishbein, 1963; Fishbein & Ajzen.
1975). The computer recorded the ratings and the rating response
latencies. Appendix A contains the complete instructions for this
task, and the modal salient belief items themselves.
Experiment 2: Audience
Subjects
Subjects were recruited in the same manner as in the first
experiment. In the second experiment. 38 males and 52 females
participated
.
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Procedure
The procedure folloiued in the <,prnnHseco d experiment luas the same as
that in t.e in 3U
.e.pects. except the presence „. the
e.peri^ente.. ,ne. sho.in, the subject Ho„ to ^ta.t the expen^ent.
the exp..i„ente. sat in
. chai. e„. until the onset of the
treatment period. „hich the oo.pute.
.i.nalo. e^ittin, a ion,
.eep.
At that point, the experimenter observed the subject thinking or
listing thoughts until the end of the three minute period, again
signaled by a beep. The screen 4f=oiPH m itself was never visible to the
experimenter. Tu/o experimenters, one male anri nn. p=>, d one female, conducted
the experiment.
Experiment 3: Posttest after Thought Listing
Subjects
Subjects uiere recruited the same u/ay as in the first and second
experiments. In the third experiment, 34 males and 56 females
participated
.
Procedure
The only difference in procedure between Experiment 3 and
Experiment 1 was that the posttest in the Distraction and Thought
groups was administered after the thought listing period rather than
before it. The procedure in the Thought Listing condition was
identical to that followed in the first experiment. All subjects
participated alone.
CHAPTER UIli
RESULTS
F1»B of the hypotheses tested In this investigation are
predictions about attitude change, polarization, and depolarization in
the W thought" situation (Hypotheses 1, 2, 3. 6, and 7). The
remaining two hypotheses (4 and 5) are predictions about the effects of
".ere thought" on the evaluative consistency of cognitive representa-
tions. The first section of this chapter will present the findings
related to the former set of hvDothecjpe
-.nriny^iotneses, and the second section will
present the evidence related to the latter.
Attitude Change, Polarization, and Depolarization
t^P°^^^-^ ^l 1 Although the primary focus of the inwestigation centered
on Hypotheses 1 and 2, that "mere thought" luill tend either to polarize
or conversely, to depolarize subjects' attitudes tou/ard the target
object, both hypotheses imply a more fundamental prediction, stated
here as Hypothesis 3. Regardless of the direction of change, "mere
thought" is predicted to result in changed attitudes.
Absolute change scores were calculated for the subjects in
Experiments 1 and 2, and analyzed in a 2-way AIMOUA. (Data obtained in
Experiment 3 were not used to test attitude change hypotheses because
subjects in all conditions completed the thought listing procedure
prior to completing the posttest, confounding the effects of the
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Figure 5
.
Mean degree of polarization as a function of
thought about target topic and presence of audience.
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Pa.ticU. ccn.Uion t.e effects of t.ou^.t Ustin,.,
, ,3
a 9raph Of t.e six ceu „ean.. Because no si.nifu.nt effect of the
presence o. essence of an eu.Unce „as fo„na. en. no si,„Uice„t
interactions occurred fho ^,4. c, t e data from the Audience and No Audience
experiments uas combined. fls oredlrtonp ic ed, a planned comparison shoued
that a greater amount of change
.as measured In the Thought (. . 4.07)
and Thought Listing conditions (. . ..gs, than In the Olstractlon
condition („ = F „ , , 7. , = g . gs
. p< .001. No significant
difference „as found between the Thought and Thought Listing conditions
F(l,174) = 1.53.
Hisotheses
,
and 2 Three different kinds of scores „ere computed to
represent the amount of attitude polarization and depolarization
exhibited by the subjects: Percentage scores, degree scores, and
absolute scores.
Figures 4a and 4b display the results obtained in Experiments 1
and 2 by using the percentage method of scoring. As can be seen in
Figure 4a, more subjects' attitudes towards "Professional football"
polarized in the Distraction groups than in the Thought groups.
Combining the data from the two experiments, 6055 of the subjects in the
Distraction condition (n = 60) shou/ed attitude polarization, and 485J
of the subjects in the Thought condition (n = 60) showed
polarization. The rate of polarization in the Distraction group uias
significantly greater than u/ould be predicted by chance (p < .01), but
the rate of polarization in the Thought group u/as about equal to the
eg
Chance rate. (The chance rate .as estWed as
.5. ta.ing the 11,
rate of no attitude change in the total sa.ple (n = ISO) as an estimate
Of the population rate of no Change.) About the sa.e percentage of
subjects in the Thought condition sho.ed attitude polarization (.8,) as
sho.ed depolarization (.2,). m contrast. 50, of the subjects in the
Distraction condition polarized, but only 23, depolarized.
The evidence based on the percentage of subjects' attitudes
polarizing and depolarizing clearly does not support Hypothesis 1, the
".ere thought" polarization hypothesis, uhich predicts that subjects in
the Thought condition
.ill polarize at a higher rate than those in the
Distraction condition. The finding that Thought subjects depolarized
at a substantially higher rate than Distraction subjects appears to
support Hypothesis 2. the depolarization hypothesis. It must be noted.
ho.BV/er, that this result can be interpreted as ev/idence of a
polarizing effect of the Distraction condition, rather than ev/idence of
a depolarizing effect of "mere thought".
Given the smaller absolute attitude change measured in the
Distraction condition (see abov/e) and the lack of a basis in attitude
change theory for predicting any effect of the Distraction condition,
an explanation for this apparent polarization effect might invoke
processes in information storage and retrieval that could introduce a
systematic bias into posttest scores. That is, subjects may attempt to
repeat their pretest responses while taking the posttest, and their
recollection of those responses may tend to be distorted in a way that
would produce a small, but reliable, pseudo-polarization effect. Such
90
an effect coul.
.3 p.e.ent in ths postt.3t scores cf subjects in
conditions of this stu.„ could o„„s.,.„«d genuine attitude
Change effects in the THou.ht and Thought Listin, conditions.
..ate„e.
the case, the difficulty of internrpMnn ^-uy UT rpreti g the evidence based on
percentage scores prevents drau/ino anv fWm •a x g y ir conclusion relevant to the
depolarization hypothesis.
Figure 5 is a graph of the six degree of polarization score means
in Experiments
1 and 2. A 2-.ay ANOVA found no significant audience
effect or interaction. so the data from the two experiments
.ere
combined to test for thought treatment effects. A planned comparison
Showed that the difference between the Distraction condition = 1.18)
and the Thought condition
= -.43) fell short of significance.
F(1.174)
= 2.59. (The difference between the Thought Listing condition
and the other two conditions is discussed below in the section on
Hypothesis 6.) Although the direction of the difference is the
opposite of that predicted by the polarization hypothesis, the finding
provides only the weakest support for the depolarization hypothesis.
Figures 6 and 7 show the mean absolute polarization and the mean
absolute depolarization scores in the two experiments. Again, 2-way
AIMOUAs showed no significant audience effects or interactions, and the
data were combined. Looking first at the absolute polarization scores,
virtually no difference was found between the Distraction (m = 1.87)
and Thought = 1.82) conditions, F(1,174) = .008. On the other hand,
absolute depolarization was significantly higher in the Thought
condition (1*1 = 2.25) than in the Distraction condition (M =
.68),
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F(1,174)
= 5.59, p < .05.
The absolute polarization and dapoia.ization acore the
advantage o„er the de,.ee of pola.i.ation
..o.ea of pe^ittin, separate
examination of polarization and depolarization effects. This advantage
is purchased by suppressing much of the information in the data,
however, and findings based on these scores must be interpreted
cautiously. For example, although the mean absolute polarization in
the Thought and Oistrection conditions »as approximately equal, it
Should be remembered that the 52« of the Thought group subjects uhose
attitudes either depolarized or did not change received absolute
polarization scores of zero, and only m of the Oistiaction group
subjects received zero scores.
It is apparent therefore, that the mean absolute polarization
score is an estimate only of the expected score for a whole group of
subjects, but that it underestimates the expected scores of those
subjects whose attitudes did polarize. Given that a subject's attitude
is known to have polarized, the best estimate of the magnitude of
polarization is the mean degree of polarization score for all subjects
Uihose attitudes polarized, excluding all cases of depolarization and no
change. Similarly, the best estimate of a depolarization score is the
mean score of cases of depolarization, excluding cases of polarization
and no change.
In order to test for the possibility that the results based on
absolute scores were merely an artifact of the scoring method, means
were calculated separately for all those subjects in the Distraction
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scores
and Thought conditions of Experiments 1 and 2 .hose attitude
either polarized or depolarized.
.
...^st comparing polarization in
the Distraction and Thought groups repealed precisely the same pattern
found in the mean absolute polarization scores. Polarization in the
Distraction condition (. = 3.17. n = 3B) .as approximately e.ual to
polarization in the Thought condition (. = 3.76. n = 29). t(65) =
.86.
A comparison of depolarization in the t.o conditions
.as also entirely
consistent
.ith the result based on absolute scores. The magnitude of
depolarization in the Distraction condition (. = 2.92. n = U) .as
significantly less than in the Thought condition = 5.4. n= 25).
t(39) = 1 .82, p < .05.
The findings obtained through separate analysis of polarization
and depolarization, by both approaches described abov/e, directly
conflict
.ith the polarization hypothesis, and provide tentative
support for the depolarization hypothesis. Even though subjects'
attitudes polarized at a some.hat higher rate in the Distraction
condition than in the Thought condition, the magnitude of polarization
in the t.o conditions .as about equal. On the other hand, attitudes
depolarized more frequently in the Thought condition than in the
Distraction condition. When depolarization did occur in the Distraction
condition, its magnitude was significantly less than in the Thought
condition.
As reported aboue in the section on Hypothesis 3. mean absolute
change scores .ere calculated for all conditions in Experiments 1 and
2. Mean absolute change can be decomposed into a part due to
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mean
polarization, ana a part due to dapola.lz.tion. I„,,et. the
absolute polarization and depolarization of a condition constitute auch
.
division o, absolute cHan,e. Per example, the „ean absolute change
in the combined Dlatractlon condition „aa 2.55. „hich Is equal to the
sum Of the
-an absolute polarization (,.87) and the „ean absolute
depolarization (.68). The proportion of absolute change attributable
to polarization In the Distraction condition (1 .87/2.55 -
.733) is
almost three ti™es the proportion attributable to depolarization
(.68/2.55 = .266). Figure 8 displays the proportions of absolute change
due to absolute polarization and depolarization in all three conditions
of the combined experiments.
Although no inferential statistical test appears to be available
to determine the significance of the differences sho^n in Figure 8. the
graph is a useful descriptive summary of the attitude change data in
Experiments 1 and 2. As shou^n in Figure 3, absolute attitude change
^as significantly higher in the Thought condition than in the
Distraction condition, yet, as Figure 6 indicates, absolute
polarization was about equal in the two conditions. The difference in
absolute attitude change is almost exclusively the result of the
significantly higher absolute depolarization measured in the Thought
group (see Figure 7). The absolute level of attitude polarization
remained fairly constant in the two conditions, but the absolute level
of depolarization increased substantially in the Thought condition.
The sharp decline of absolute polarization as a proportion of absolute
change shown in Figure 8 occurred because, while polarization stayed
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constant, t.e total absolute chan.e „easu„d in the THou.ht condition
Included an increased amount of depclarizatlcn.
The various
-thods of scoring polarization and depolarization
that were employed in this investigation are merely different
approaches to examining the same data, pre-posttest differences In
semantic differential attitude scores recorded in Experiments 1 and 2.
The purpose of using a number of methods of analysis „as to focus on
enough different aspects of the data to ferret out any patterns that
are present in it. No claim Is made that the results reported in this
section are independent of each other; the findings must be evaluated
as a whole. Putting these results together, the data obtained in
Experiments
1 and 2 appear consistent with the folloulng tuo
conclusions
.
First, the data do not support Hypothesis 1, Tesser's polarization
hypothesis, and their overall trend is actually the opposite of uihat
this hypothesis predicts. It is unlikely that "Professional football"
has especially unusual characteristics as a target topic in a study of
"mere thought" attitude change, and there are probably many topics
that would produce similar results. Therefore, the polarization
hypothesis seems to be untenable as a general prediction about the
effects of "mere thought" on attitudes.
Second, the data give some support to the present depolarization
hypothesis, but not enough to warrant retaining it as a general
prediction. Despite the relatively, large sample (n = 60 in each of the
combined Distraction and Thought groups), the depolarization effect of
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"mere thought" attained, at bast „ni • .h , only a minimal accaptable laual of
Significance. Ho.eve.. the evidence does support the proposition that,
under conditions that „era to some extent present in this
investigation,
"mere thought" is likely to produce a depolariration
effect. Identifying precisely „hat factors are Involved in determining
Whether "mere thought" produces attifi.Ho n i •P o itude polarization or depolarization
is a problem that requires further research.
Hl££thesis 6 The prediction that writing down thoughts about a topic
.ould tend to result in depolarization of subjects' attitudes toward
that topic received strong support in the findings of Experiments 1 and
2. The same methods used to score polarization and depolarization in
the Distraction and the Thought conditions were used to score the
change data obtained in the Thought Listing condition. The findings
of a depolarization effect of thought listing are displayed in the same
figures that show the results in the other two conditions.
Percentages of subjects' attitudes polarizing and depolarizing are
shown in Figures 4a and 4b, which are separate graphs of the results of
Experiments 1 and 2. Combining the data from the two experiments, the
58^ rate of depolarization in the Thought Listing condition (n = 60)
was significantly greater than the expected chance rate of 455?, p <
Figure 5 graphs the mean degree of polarization in the six groups
of Experiments 1 and 2. As already mentioned, a 2-way ANOUA of the
degree of polarization scores found no significant audience effect or
interaction, so the data from the two experiments were combined. A
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in the
Planned comparison found that the
.ean degree of polarization
Thought L-ting condition (. = _1. ,8) .as Significantly Wr than in
the Distraction condition (. = i.ia). P(1,1,,)
.
,.,3, ^ , ^^^^
not differ significantly fron, the Thought condition =
.43),
F(1,174) = 1.1.
The .ean absolute depolarization scores for the six groups in the
t.o experiments are displayed in Figure 7. The mean absolute
depolarization score in the combined Thought Listing condition =
3.22) .as significantly greater than that in the Distraction condition
(^=.68), F(1.174)
= U.6A. p<.001. The difference between the
Thought Listing condition and the Thought condition = 2.25) was not
significant, howeuer, F(1,174) = 2.135.
Finally, as shown in Figure 8, the mean absolute depolarization
measured in the Thought Listing condition constituted B5% of the mean
absolute change in that condition. In contrast, only 275? of the
absolute change in the Distraction condition was due to depolarization,
and 55^ in the Thought condition was due to depolarization.
Unlike the depolarization effect of the Thought condition, the
effect of the Thought Listing condition is significant regardless of
which scoring method is used. As indicated in Chapter 6, at least two
explanations can be offered for the apparent depolarizing effect of
thought listing. The first is that thought listing alerts the subject
to the possibility that others might challenge his or her uiews,
prompting the subject to adopt a "strategy of moderation" (Cialdini, et
al., 1973), The other is that thought listing may initiate an internal
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;s that
dialogue in .hicH the subject tests the
.alidity of the statement
he o. She has put in ..iting hy searching for contrary information. or
counterarguments, in long term memory.
The investigation produced some evidence that the attitude change
that .as measured in the Thought Listing condition persisted for a time
after completion of the semantic differential posttest. The final
phase of the experimental procedure in all conditions
.as the
completion of a 20 item attitude scale consisting of modal belief
statements obtained in a pilot study, m the Thought Listing condition,
the partial correlation between posttest scores and modal belief
scores. controlling for pretest scores,
.as
.50. p < .001
. On the
other hand. the partial correlation between pretest scores and modal
belief scores. controlling for posttest scores, .as -.09, .hich is not
significantly different from a correlation of zero. In other .ords,
u/hen the part of the posttest variance that is explained by the pretest
is removed from the posttest scores, the remaining scores. consisting
mainly of the pretest-posttest differences, or change, still accounts
for 2S% of the modal belief variance. Similar evidence of persistence
of attitude change .as not found in either the Thought or Distraction
conditions
.
Table 1 presents the relevant correlation coefficients for all
three conditions. Seven of the 120 cases in the Distraction and Thought
conditions were excluded in order to eliminate outliers. In these
instances subjects scored an extreme posttest score in one evaluative
direction, and an extreme modal belief score in the opposite direction.
Table 1
Zaro-Ordnr and Flrat-Ordar P.rn.i r , ..S_u cie a tial Correlation, Aoionq Pratestd),
PoattB3t(2j and [lodal BeliefsU) Attitude Score,
1-2 1-4
Correlation coefficients
1-4.2 2-4 2-4,1
detraction
.ge .
.34 .
.ig ^^2 '
.04
.84 •
.70 •
.38 .65 •
56
15 57
Thought Listing
.86 •
.56 •
-.og
.gg . .50 .
•--p < .001 "'--p < .002
Note a The numbered headings correspond to the follou-ing attitude
score typeai 1-Pretest, 2-Po»tte8t, 4-«lodal Belief Scale.
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the apparent result of failure to folio, the instructions for making
responses on the modal belief scale. Data collected in the Thought
Listing condition in Experiment 3 .ere included in this analysis
because the procedure followed was identical to that of Experiment Vs
Thought Listing condition. Pi.e of the 90 cases in the combined
Thought Listing condition were excluded for the same reason cases were
excluded from the other two conditions.
As Table
1 shows. subjects in the Thought condition did not
display the pattern of apparent attitude persistence that Thought
Listing subjects displayed. Instead. they appear to hawe reverted
somewhat to their pretest attitudes toward the target topic by the
time they completed the modal beliefs scale. In the Distraction
condition, the information contained in the posttest scores provides no
better prediction of the modal beliefs score than the pretest scores.
This finding is consistent with the general absence of attitude change
as a consequence of the Distraction treatment.
Overall, the data suggest that thought listing tends to produce a
more persistent attitude change effect than "mere thought" alone, and
that, in the case of the target topic "Professional football", at least
among college students, this effect is depolarization. In view of the
present investigation's failure to support either a general
polarization or depolarization hypothesis about the effect of "mere
thought", it seems best to interpret the findings concerning the effect
of thought listing cautiously. It is very possible that the
depolarization effect observed in the current study may not reflect a
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general depolarization effect of
demonstrate, however, that there
effect u/ill be manifest.
ught listing. The results do
conditions under which such an
ttothesis 7 The "mere presence" of others has been shown to have
either a facilitating or inhibiting influence on the performance of a
wide range of overt behaviors ( Za jonc
. 1 968 ) . Having an audience or not
may also affect the performance of covert cognitive tasks, such as
thinking about a target topic. Unlike overt behavior, however, covert
behavior like thinking cannot be observed directly. The apparent
relation of thinking to attitude change suggests the possibility
that social facilitation effects on thinking can be observed
indirectly. That is, as Hypothesis 7 states, the presence of an
audience while a person thinks about a target topic might be associated
either with a greater or lesser amount of attitude change (i.e.,
polarization or depolarization) than might be associated with solitude
during thought. As the reader may have noted already while examining
Figures A through 8, the current investigation produced no evidence in
support of this hypothesis.
Figure 3 displays the mean absolute attitude change scores for the
six conditions of Experiments 1 and 2, the No Audience and Audience
experiments. Although the level of attitude change recorded when the
experimenter was present while subjects completed the experimental
tasks was consistently lower (Pt = 3.53) than when subjects participated
alone (M = 4.18), this difference was not significant (F(1, 174) =
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1.2). no consistent reUtion betusan ths presence of .„ audienc
apparent in the enelyses of degree of polarlzstion and absolut
polarization and depolarization scores, displayed in Figures « through
e IS
e
7.
In view of the present study's failure to support Hypothesis 7. it
may be tentatively concluded that if the .ere presence of others has an
impact on the processes that often lead to attitude change in the 'We
thought" situation. the effect is quite s.all. Detecting such an
audience effect apparently
.ould require the use of very large samples,
given that the No Audience and Audience conditions in the current
investigation each included 90 subjects. It is possible hou,ever. that
variants of the audience manipulation that, for example. introduced
evaluation apprehension, or competition, into the "mere thought"
situation. might be associated u/ith more substantial effects on
subjects' attitudes. Future research may shed light on this issue.
Evaluative Consistency
Hypotheses 4 and 5^ The key assumption in Abraham Tesser's derivation
of his "mere thought" attitude polarization hypothesis is that, when
people think about some object, and receive no additional information
from external sources, they are likely to increase the evaluative
consistency of their representation of the object. The opposite
proposition has been advocated here. It is equally reasonable to
suspect that. the longer a person thinks about something, the more
tuo-sided the object's representation is likely to become. The
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existence of numerous plausible arguments for both positions on this
issue suggests that neither statement should be granted the status of
an assumption. The data collected during the present investigation
provide an empirical basis for considering this question.
subjects in all nine treatment groups in the study completed
a thought listing procedure during which they reported their thoughts
about the target topic as the thoughts occurred. Analysis of the
relation of the temporal order of the listed thoughts to their
consistency
.ith the subjects' attitudes toward the target topic
provides a fairly direct test of the two opposed hypotheses. If
earlier thoughts tend to be lass attitude consistent than later
thoughts. then Tesser's hypothesis would be supported. On the other
hand, if later thoughts. or "second thoughts", tend to be less
consistent, the present hypothesis would be supported. As can be seen
in Table 2, a matched-pairs t-test analysis of the thought listing data
yielded unambiguous support for the present hypothesis.
Details of the method used to compute the proportions of
consistent affect expressed in the first and second halves of the
thought listing protocols can be found in Chapter 6. Table 2 shows
that, regardless of treatment condition, when subjects listed their
thoughts about "Professional football", their earlier thoughts tended
to be associated with a higher proportion of attitude-consistent affect
than their later thoughts. Combining the data from 269 subjects'
protocols, the difference between the mean proportion of consistent
affect in the first half (M = .81) and the second half = .68),
Tabls 2
Comparlaona of the mean Proportion, af r«„ 4 * .
First and s I
^
' -
^"""^'^'"^ HlSCt Exprassad in th.li£iE Second Haluea of Subjects' tk . .
^
^
"~ —
"Profeaainn,, footb,~ '^^^ ^^^^^ ^
a.9^0«ll
. 12 Mine Experimenf . 1 Conditiona
Condition
First
Half
naan
Second
Half
nean
Sig.
No Audience I
Distraction
Thought
Thought Listing
Audience
Oistraction
Thought
Thought Listing
No AudiancB II
Distraction
Thought
Thought Listing
All Conditions
Distraction
Thought
Thought Listing
.81
.77
.83
.84
.80
.75
.83
.83
.82
.88
.78
.81
.81
.80
.81
.83
.87
.89
.83
.89
.88
.88
.84
.87
.70
.71
.69
.71
.68
.69
.67
.69
3.67
1 .39
2.80
2.06
3.74
.93
3.22
2.62
2.92
3.19
.89
1 .46
5.98
2.99
3.74
3.56
P < .001
N.S
P < .01
P < .05
P < .001
N.S.
p < .01
P < .02
p < .01
p < .01
N.S.
N.S.
p < .001
p < .01
p < .001
p < .001
as
28
30
30
89
29
30
30
92
31
31
30
269
88
91
90
Table 3
Cotnparlsona of the nean Consistent Affo^^ e
Halves of Subject " " iiEIS2»5d in the First and SecondO lub^ Thouaht
Mng Experimental Conditions 2£ioaii_ in
Condition
First
Half
nean
Second
Half
Itean
Sig.
No Audience I
Distraction
Thought
Thought Listing
Audience
Distraction
Thought
Thought Listing
No Audience II
Distraction
Thought
Thought Listing
All Conditions
Distraction
Thought
Thought Listing
17.32
17.20
18.70
16.08
17.62
15.10
20.10
17.58
18.63
18.79
18.67
18.41
17.87
17.06
19. IS
17.36
13.82
14.01
15.10
12.38
13.12
13.56
12.66
13.15
14.95
13.56
15.41
15.91
13.97
13.70
14.40
13.81
4.15
1 .89
2.46
2.87
4.56
1 .03
5.12
2.23
4.21
3.44
2.44
1 .48
7.48
3.70
5.71
3.68
P < .001
P < .10
P < .02
P < .01
P < .001
M.S.
P < .001
P < .05
P < .001
P < .001
P < .05
M.S.
P < .001
p < .001
p < .001
p < .001
88
28
30
30
89
29
30
30
92
31
3l
30
269
88
91
90
Tabla 4
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Condition
No Audience I
Distraction
Thought
Thought Listing
Audience
Distraction
Thought
Thought Listing
No Audience II
Distraction
Thought
Thought Listing
All Conditions
Distraction
Thought
Thought Listing
First
Half
naan
3.88
3.69
4.27
3.65
Second
Half
Itean
5.20
4.78
6.17
4.64
Sig.
3.96 5.35
-2.10 P < .05 88
4.29 5.25
-0.86 N.S. 28
4.47 6.80
-1 .67 M.S. 30
3.17 4.00
-0.96 N.S. 30
4.06 S.74
-2.39 P < .02 89
4.45 4.03
.37 N.S. 29
3.75 6.85
-1 .67 N.S. 30
4.01 6.28
-2.06 P < .05 30
3.60 4.55
-1 .42 N.S. 92
2.46 5.08
-2.32 P < .05 31
4.58 4.90
-0.25 N.S. 31
3.78 3.65
.13 N.S. 30
-3.42
-1 .68
•2.45
•1 .70
P < .001
P < .10
P < .02
P < .10
269
88
91
90
Tabla S
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Comoarlaon, of the We,n Total Aff-rf r
!«lni I«EarlMnt.l C.ndltl.n.
la Prof.„l„n.l £03^^11: In
Condition
First
Half
n«an
Second
Half
Claan
Sig.
No Audiancs I
Distraction
Thought
Thought Listing
Audience
Distraction
Thought
Thought Listing
No Audience II
Distraction
Thought
Thought Listing
All Conditions
Distraction
Thought
Thought Listing
21.29
21 .48
23.17
19.25
21 .69
19.55
23.85
21 .80
22.23
21 .26
23.26
22.20
21 ,74
20.77
23.42
21 .01
19.18
19.28
21 .90
16.38
18.86
17.58
19.51
19.43
19.51
18.65
20.32
19.56
19.19
18.49
20.57
18.46
2.66
1 .33
1.10
2.13
3.36
1 .62
3.04
1 .28
3.71
1 .93
2.73
1 .85
5.63
2.82
4.01
3.00
p < .01
M.S.
M.S.
P < .05
P < .001
P < .10
p < .01
P < .10
88
28
30
30
P < .002 89
N.S. 29
P < .01 30
N.S. 30
92
31
31
30
p < .001 269
p < .01 88
p < .001 91
p < .01 90
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greatly exceeded conventional criteria „f significance (t(26e) =
=.3e,.
p < .po,. ,3 examination of Table 2 „ill ,e„eal, no „atte. ho.
the data .are subdivided, the same result a»ar,ed. «ben they reached
the thought listin, phase of the experiment, subjects in all conditions
tended to begin by listing thoughts that uara more consistent
.ith
their attitudes towards
"Professional football" than „ere the final
thoughts they listed.
Proportion of attitude consistent affect has been defined here as
the ratio of consistent expressed affect to the total expressed
affect. The total expressed affect is the sun, of the consistent
expressed affect and the inconsistent expressed affect. Tables 3. A,
and 5 display the results of matched-pair t-tests of the three
components of the proportion of consistent affect scores. The tables
rev/eal the pattern of v/erbal behavior that underlies the decline in the
proportion of consistent affect expressed in the first and second
halves of the protocols.
Table 3 shows that consistent affect declined not only as a
proportion of total affect, but in absolute magnitude. Pooling the
data from all subjects' protocols, the statements in the first half of
the protocols received a significantly higher mean consistent affect
score (m = 17.87) than the second half (1*1 = 13.97), t(268) = 7.48, p <
produced the same result: subjects expressed a greater amount of
consistent affect earlier in their protocols than they did later.
Table 4 reveals that the expression of inconsistent affect
followed the opposite course. Across all conditions, subjects tended
1QB
to express less inconsistent affect in the fi.st half of their
protocols (. =3.88), than they expressed in the second half (. =
5.2G), t(268)
= -3.24. p < .001. ,hile expression of consistent affect
decreased, expression of inconsistent affect increased.
The trend in the total affect expressed in the protocols is
displayed in Table 5. Subjects tended to communicate more total affect
in the first half of their protocols 21.74) than in the second
half (m = 19.19), t(268) = 5.71, p < nni sn fh' ^ <i p .UU1. So the rise in the
expression of inconsistent affect stands against an owerall decline in
affect expressed.
Overall, the data present the following picture of the sequence of
subjects' werbal expressions concerning the target object in a "mere
thought" situation. Their initial statements are likely to be
eualuatively consistent u/ith their attitude toward the object, and are
likely to be associated with relatively intense affect. Later
statements are still more likely than not to be evaluatiwely
consistent, but later statements are more likely to be inconsistent
than early statements. In general, later statements tend to be
associated with less intense affect than initial statements; however,
later inconsistent statements tend to express greater affect than
earlier inconsistent statements.
The findings seem to be consistent with the notion outlined in the
Introduction and in Chapter 6 of thinking as a dialectical process that
continuously improves the veridicality of a representation by
counter posing cognitive elements that represent both favorable and
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unfavorable aspects of an ohi.rt t„.» j ,Objec . Instead of producing representations
=
f Objects that are either all "good" or all "bad", as Tesser's
interpretation of cognitive consistency theory maintains, thinking
appears to yield t„o-sided representations that mirror the complexity
of Objects in the real „orld. The data appear to sho» that "second
thoughts" are a regular feature of human cognition.
Summary
This chapter has presented the main findings of three experiments
conducted to test seven hypotheses related to Abraham Tesser's "mere
thought" attitude change paradigm. Five of these hypotheses u;ere
predictions about attitude change as a consequence of "mere thought",
and tuio u/ere predictions about changes in the evaluative consistency of
representation of an object as a function of length of time spent
thinking
.
The findings clearly demonstrate that attitude change is likely to
occur in the "mere thought" situation, a prediction of the cognitive
mediation model of attitude change. Rather than producing attitude
polarization, as Tesser predicts, the "mere thought" treatment in the
current investigation produced a weak depolarization effect. This
result is consistent with the depolarization hypothesis advanced in the
Introduction and in Chapter 6, but the borderline significance of the
finding argues against retention of this hypothesis as a general
prediction. Tesser's hypothesis that thought listing is likely to
depolarize attitudes was strongly supported here. The fifth attitude
1 1 0
change hypothesis tested in the experiments th«f fhHci , at the mere presence of
an audlencs uould either facilitate or Impede attitude change. „as not
supported. FlnaU,, the data demonstrate that, contrary to Tee.er'e
prediction and consistent
.1th the present prediction, the cognitive
contents of forking ^e.ory are U.sl, to become less e„aluatl„elv
consistent the .ore time subjects spend thinking about a target object.
Some of the Implications of these findings for attitude change theory
and research uUl be discussed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER IX
DISCUSSION
s
as a
At the beginning of this paper. It „,s a.g„ed that Tssser's (,97B)
"mere thought" attitude polarization hypothesis is contradicted by the
common sense uiew of the efferf.; nf fk^^i •rtects o thinking on attitudes. The common
sense view. based on Western society's traditional opposition of cold
reason to hot emotion. is that thinking generally tends to moderate
attitudes. and can even reverse an initial attitude through the
occurrence of "second thoughts". ,hen a theory implies a testable
prediction that conflicts uith common sense, and that prediction i
borne out by empirical evidence, the theory deserves to be valued
source of insight that transcends everyday blindness. On the other
hand, empirical evidence can often evaporate when the
operationalization of variables and the method of data collection are
scrutinized. The divergence between the polarization hypothesis and
popular ideas about the effects of thinking on attitudes is a clear
signal that the theory behind the hypothesis, and the evidence adduced
in its support. need to be put under the lens of critical analysis.
Unfortunately. little critical work has been done so far, and the
present investigation has made only a small start in carrying out the
rigorous assessment that the polarization hypothesis merits.
Even though the empirical findings that have been reported here
supply just a few pieces in a very large puzzle, the data appear
difficult to reconcile with any general statement of a "mere thought"
1 1
1
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attitude polarization hypothesis Tncf = o^ *•Tines . Instead of reporting more polarized
attitudes after thinking about the target topic. subjects
.ho engaged
in ".era thought" about the topic tended to report less polarized, and
occasionally. reversed attitudes. This depolarization effect .as only
of borderline significance, but .as so far opposite to the polarization
prediction that the general validity of that hypothesis is thro.n into
serious doubt. ^ore importantly. the temporal trend analysis of the
thought listing protocols that all subjects completed (either
subsequent to treatment or as a treatment) produced a strong finding
directly counter to Tesser's key assumption of a trend to.ards
increased ev/aluative consistency. The subjects' later thoughts tended
to be less evaluatiuely consistent than their earlier thoughts. In
other uiords. there uias a powerful tendency for subjects to report
"second thoughts" that could tend to moderate their initial attitudes.
This tendency is precisely .hat .ould be expected on the basis of the
assumption that thinking generally has the adaptive function of
constructing veridical representations of the environment in .hich a
person must behave.
In Chapter 2's discussion of the theoretical basis of Tesser's
"mere thought" attitude polarization hypothesis. the existence of
cognitive schemas that guide the course of thinking was left an open
question outside the scope of the present investigation. It should be
noted. ho. ever, that the tendency to.ard an ordered sequence of
attitude consistent and attitude inconsistent statements that was
observed in the thought listing protocols collected in this study can
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be interpreted as evidence of schematic control of the subjects'
representational processes. Schemes can be regarded as systems of
rules for integrating information from external and internal sources
into conscious representations of objects and of relations among
Objects. Three regularities emerged in subjects' protocols that appear
to indicate the operation of a system of rules controlling the order in
u-hich subjects become conscious of and able to express stored
information about a target object. First, the most strongly affective
statements in the protocols tended to occur early, and the least
affective statements tended to occur late. Second, a greater
proportion of early statements were attitude consistent than of later
statements. Finally, a greater proportion of later statements were
attitude inconsistent than of early statements, and later inconsistent
statements tended to express stronger affect than early inconsistent
statements
.
Given that these patterns are clearly not consequences of subjects
randomly retrieving items of information about the target object from
their pools of information about the object in long term memory, it
seems reasonable to conclude that what can be called 'schemas' appear
to direct the production of thought listing protocols. Although it is
not possible at this stage to describe the nature of these schemas,
defining them simply as the control systems responsible for the
observed patterns in the protocols is defensible. As Fodor (1968, p.
13) has argued, geneticists adopted the concept of "genes" as an
explanation for the heritability of biological traits decades before
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the, „ere able to identify D« „olecule= as the bearers of genetio
code. Something
.ertainl, accounts for the regularities observed in
the protocols, and for the ti„e being it see^s adequate to refer to
this 'something' as 'cognitive schemas'.
The sche.as evidenced in the present data are obviously unlike the
schemes that lesser believes
.ork to steadily increase the evaluative
consistency of a person's conscious representation of an object as the
person continues thinking about it. Rather than forming one-sided,
"all good" or "all bad" representations of objects. these schemas
apparently form t.o-sided. or .hat may be termed 'objective'
representations. Of course, the subjects displayed much variability in
the two-sidedness of their protocols. u;ith some expressing only
attitude consistent affect and some expressing almost as much
inconsistent as consistent affect. The modal pattern, hou/ever, u;hich
may be taken as an indication of the modal schema. u,as to describe both
favorable and unfavorable aspects of the target object. with a strong
predominance of attitude consistent statements. As noted earlier. it
has been generally agreed at least since the time of Plato (Russell,
1972, p. 121) that real objects always have positive and negative
attributes. Thus, the modal schema whose workings were detected in the
present investigation appears to steer thought toward the production of
veridical conscious representations.
Turning to another issue, in the discussion of the cognitive
mediation model of attitude change in Chapter 5, it was argued that
"mere thought" would be likely to be an effective means of changing
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attuu.es.
.ut that the ™„.el ... „„t necessa.Uv predict the direction
Of such self-gene.ated attitude Change. «he.e an external influence
atte.pt ie ii.ely to instigate the retrieval into uor.ing „enory of
beliefs that are not directly relat^ri fn =. r, .x ated to a person's evaluation of a
target object. We thought" is li.ely to instigate the retrieval of
the primary beliefs that Fishbein and Ajzen's (1975) theory of reasoned
action identifies as the direct determinants of the person's attitude
toward the object. Once in working
.e.ory, the primary beliefs become
subject to the pro and counterargumentation that cognitive response
theorists (e.g., Petty & Caccioppo, 1 981 ) vie. as the mechanism that
brings about persisting attitude change.
The current findings strongly support the expectation that "mere
thought"
.ill result in measurable attitude change. Although the
present experiments have obviously not settled the issue of the
validity of either a polarization or a depolarization hypothesis about
the effects of "mere thought", it is encouraging that the more basic
attitude change prediction of the cognitive mediation model has been
borne out in the experiments' results. The significantly greater
absolute attitude change in the Thought and Thought Listing conditions
than in the Distraction conditions appears to demonstrate the
fundamental soundness of the model as a guide to the study of attitude
change. Thus, the study adds to the growing body of evidence showing
that attitude change is best thought of as the outcome of active
internal information processing rather than of passive response to
external influence.
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The „o.t effective attitude c.en.e t.eat^ent in t.e experiments
«as Thought Listing in „.icn subjects typed thei. tHou,.ts about the
target object durin, a three minute
-„ere thought" period. As
predicted by Tesser. tbou.bt listing tended to e.ert a depoiari.in,
influence on subjects' attitudes Ti.m H<^^^^^.i-ituoes. wo different explanations can be
advanced to account for this finding. Pi.st, the requirement that they
.ake their thoughts about the target object public
.ay alert the
subjects to the possibility that others
.ight challenge their views.
The subjects then adopt a "strategy of moderation" (Cialdini. etal..
1973) in completing the posttest attitude measurement in order to
present a position that can be defended against a wide range of
potential opponents. The second explanation is that thought listing
merely intensifies the dialectical process characteristic of "mere
thought". The act of making a thought external increases the
likelihood that the thought will instigate the construction of a
counterposed "second thought". The presence of these second thoughts
in working memory results in genuine depolarization of the subject's
attitude that is reflected in the posttest responses. Perhaps a
critical experiment could be designed to pit these two positions
against each other, but the present data does not support one over the
other. This unsettled issue will have to be left as a topic for future
study
.
Another important question that this investigation has left
unanswered is why Tesser's data shows a polarization effect of
thinking, and the current data tend to show an opposite depolarization
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effect. The conceptual an. methodological critique of Tessex's
experimental procedures presented In Chapter
. may supply a fe. leads
to finding
-
explanation for the contradictory data. At least t„o
potential sources of the discrepancy can he Identified. One
possibility is that the use of a sln,le-Ue„ pre- and posttest attitude
measure In Tesser's studies may have alWd subjects to ma.e their
posttest judgement more on the basis of their memory for their pretest
rating than on their current attitudes toward the target object.
Subjects may have experienced the posttest as the experimenter's effort
to "double-Check" the accuracy of their pretest ratings, and gUen
their relatively precise recall of their single pretest responses, they
»ay have chosen to emphasize their prior positions »ith more extreme
posttest ratings.
Post experimental intervieu/s uith subjects in the present
investigation rev/ealed a u,idespread perception that the post test u;as
intended to test the v/alidity of the pretest ratings by determining how
"consistent" the ratings uiould remain over time. Inconsistent ratings
would allou, the experimenter to detect subjects u/ho, for uihatever
reasons, gave inaccurate responses on the pretest scales. (Almost all
subjects reported having tried to recall their pretest responses during
the posttest, but they usually noted the difficulty of remembering
their responses accurately, due to the number of scale items and the
scrambled order of presentation.)
This problem seems to be inherent in the pre-posttest design, no
matter how many items are used, no matter what measures are taken to
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pre-
Interfax „Uh subjects' recall of p.atest
.asponsas. Sln,le-lta™
and posttest
-asuras ara aspaclally susceptible to the confounding
influence of subjects' memory for pretest r.,r,nn.. u1 "1 tjrece espo ses because subjects
are .ore capable of recalling a single response than multiple
responses. Both the present experimental procedure and Tesser's can be
criticized for allowing this confounding variable to effect results.
The current study's use of multiple item attitude scales probably
reduced the effect of pretest recall, however. It is conceivable,
therefore, that the opposite findings can be explained as the result of
the different degree of influence of pretest recall on posttest ratings
in the two procedures.
Another possible cause of the opposed findings is Tesser's use of
novel target topics in contrast with the present study's use of a
familiar target object. As discussed in Chapter 4, Tesser's "mere
thought" experiments are more correctly categorized as attitude
formation than attitude change studies. It seems reasonable that a
person's initial attitude toward a novel stimulus object would be more
neutral than the attitude after a period of thought about the object.
Thinking might produce a more polarized attitude toward a novel target
object by constructing a more developed and coherent cognitive
representation than the person's initial sketchy representation.
Thought might both raise the subjective probability of the links
between the object and the initial, externally communicated, set of
attributes. and it might generate inferences about additional
attributes that would tend to be evaluatively consistent with the
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e a
P0U.1.,„,
.„ect or tHi„«„,
^^^^^
attitude formation, and the nrooor,4. ^ i.present data demonstrate a depolarizing
effect Of thinking about an object after a representation and attitude
have been formed. Further research may clarify this issue.
Not surprisingly. this investigation has left many questions
unanswered, and has possibly brought confusion to issues that
previously seemed clear. Some interesting findings did emerge,
however. particularly in the analysis of subjects' thought listing
protocols. Although many theorists have believed otherwise, the
protocols demonstrate the validity of the popular assumption that
thoughtful consideration is likely to lead a person to "second
thoughts" that provide a more reliable guide to adaptive behavior than
initial. evaluatively consistent. thoughts and feelings. By
integrating both favorable and unfavorable attributes into their
representations of objects, people arrive at more veridical models of
how the objects might facilitate and impede accomplishment of their
goals and values. Social psychologists with a cognitive orientation
have tended to emphasize the many ways that human thought processes can
produce erroneous conclusions. yet it should be evident that people
would not survive long if thinking served principally to deceive them
(cf. McGuire, 1986). This study's finding that thought often has the
beneficial effect of making people aware of both the good and the bad
aspects of things may help shift interest to studying the adaptive
value of thinking.
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APPENDIX A
PRINTOUT OF THE COMPUTERIZED QUESTIONNAIRE
INSTRUCTIONS AND PRETEST
pate. The purpose of the experiment f T ^°''J°'' agreeing to partici-
topics. There are no right or wono Insllrl f T ™" ™^ ^^eto respond to here. Alwlys sel^t f III questions you will be asked
YOUR OWN OPINION on the ^opi?!
''""^^ '° ^ ''"^^^i"" ^^ich best states
rlZU^^ZT.^^^^^^^^ llll^f^
delays when you finish
these delays when they occur.)
"""""^^^ ^^^<^y ^o proceed. Please bear with
Before beginning the first part of the Pxnpr-imoni- iground questions which will appear on tJe sS!n k ^
^^^^
To see the first background qSL^L" pSss an^ ke; '
^"^"^'^
<Press any key to continue>
TYPE IN THE APPROPRIATE ANSWER.
Please press RETURN after you type each answer.
What is your age (i.e. 20)
What is your academic major (i.e. psychology)
What is your gender (press M or F)
What year will you graduate (i.e. 87)
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY,
In the first part of this experiment you are asked to rate your opinion onseveral topics by using seven-place scales. Please look at the example of a
seven-place scale displayed below:
PLEASANT
1
UNPLEASANT
7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER SLIGHTLT SOMEWHAT EmBmT
To select a rating on a PLEASANT-UNPLEASANT scale, you would first decide
whether the topic is PLEASANT or UNPLEASANT. Then you would decide HOW PLEA-
SANT? or HOW UNPLEASANT? Then you would select the number on the scale which
most accurately describes your opinion.
Use the TOP ROW OF NUMBER KEYS to enter your rating into the computer. If
for example, you think that a topic is NEITHER PLEASANT nor UNPLEASANT, you
would press Key #4. If the topic seems EXTREMELY UNPLEASANT, press Key #7. If
the topic seems EXTREMELY PLEASANT, press Key #1. And so on.
<Press RETURN to continue>
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Although different adjectLes ar^^LS
.«.h ' PLEASANT-UNPLEASANT,choosing a rating is the same. SeJect ?L n k'"^^' ^^^^^ Principle inpresses what the topic means to you °" ^"^^ "^^''^ best ex-
will'^: 5L'pLyrd1e[rit^"Ea:r?Ln °' — scale
next scale will be displayed befow oSic'''^' \° ^ "^^"8' ^^escales for a particular topic, a LzzSr ^n' T ^^"^ "-"Pleted all ten
next topic. When you finish ^atinR aU ° '"^ on to thepart of the experiment. Thank^ou^oJ'y^S; coSp:r;tL°n.^''' °"
^°
of the topic displayed above the scale.
TV Commercials
FAIR
1
1
2 3
1
4
1
1
5 6
1
UNFAIF
7
1EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER
TV Commercials
SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
GOOD
1 2 3
1
.
A 5 6
1
BAD
7
1EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER
TV Commercials
SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
USEFUL
1
1
2 3
1
U
1
,
1
5 6
USELESS
7
1EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER
TV Commercials
SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
HAPPY
1 2 3 A
1 1
5 6
SAD
7
1EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER
TV Commercials
SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
REWARDING
1 2 3 4
1
1
5
1
6
PUNISHING
7
1EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
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TV CoDimercials
BENEFICIAL
1 2
EXTREMELY
-SOMEWHAT^UG^
TV Commercials
OPTIMISTIC
1 2 T . .
HARMFUL
7
SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
PESSIMISTIC
7
EXTREMLY SOMEWHAT
-sUGimj-'
-NEITHER
TV Commercials
PLEASANT
1 5 1 , _
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT iLIGimT-'
' NEITHER ' SLIGHTLY
TV Commercials
SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
UNPLEASANT
6 7
^1
SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
VALUABLE
1 WORTHLESS
7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER— SLIGHTLY
TV Commercials
SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
ATTRACTIVE
1 2
UNATTRACTIVE
6 7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER SLIGHTLY
A new topic is about to be displayed. Please wait.
Daycare
SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
FAIR
1
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY
UNFAIR
NEITHER SLIGHTLY
Daycare
SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
VALUABLE
1
WORTHLESS
7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
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Daycare
GOOD
1
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER
Daycare
BAD
SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
USEFUL
1
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT "SLIGHTLY" NEITHER
Daycare
USELESS
7
SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
PLEASANT
1 2
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER
Daycare
UNPLEASANT
6 7
SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
HAPPY
1
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY
SAD
NEITHER SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
Daycare
REWARDING
1 2
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER
Daycare
PUNISHING
7
SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
ATTRACTIVE
1 2
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER
Daycare
UNATTRACTIVE
7
SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
OPTIMISTIC
1 2
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER
Daycare
PESSIMISTIC
7
SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
BENEFICIAL
1 2
HARMFUL
7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
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A new topic is about to be displayed. Please wait.
Abstract art
USEFUL1,2 3 , USELESS
I
I I I
^
,
^ 7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT 'IOgHTLY-'- NEITHER rrurr v"'-?^ Itii t SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
Abstract art
PLEASANT12 3-^ UNPLEASANT
I
I
I 1^,^,7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT "SLIGHTLY mfttutd -'—V, x^,^— 'b ib l NEITHER SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTRH^
Abstract art
FAIR12 3/, UNFAIR
I I ^ 1^56 7
EXTREMELY soMBfflAT
-sLiGHiLY mmr-^~sLim:r^-mw;m~^mmm
Abstract art
GOOD
'
I
^
I
3 4 5
EXTRfflar SOMMAT TUGmn irLllHl.K
.LIOHIU ' ^OMMAT
'
exTKMELY
Abstract art
VALUABLE
1 n _ , WORTHLESS
^
1
^
1
3 4 5 6 7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER-'^OGHilT-'^^
Abstract art
''^f^™^ , , PUNISHING
I
I
I I
^
6 7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHILY NEITHER SLIGHTLt' SOMEWHAT 'imlilJ
Abstract art
^^fICIAL HARMFUL^,2 3 4 5 6 7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EmEMELY
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Abstract art
ATTRACriVE
1
UNATTRACTIVE
EXTREMELY
"SOFffiWHAT
'^lOTtT-'-ne^^
I
'
NEITHER SLIGHTLY ^MeWHaT"' ECTRI^
Abstract art
HAPPY
1
5 -
EXTREMELY "SOFffiWHAT
'-lElGHTiT^
^1
'
NfciraER SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT ~ EXTMJ
Abstract art
OPTIMISTIC
I
J
2 3 ^
^ ^
PESSIMISTIC
mmmj
"soMat'^iotly-'^jeit^ L_NtlTHER SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTMJ
A new topic is about to be displayed. Please wait.
Capital punishment
GOOD
Capital punishment
PLEASANT123,^ UNPLEASANT
|_
I I I
^ 6 7
EXTREMLY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER tputt v Itif SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
Capital punishment
BENEFICIAL
1 234^^ HARMFUL
mmwj
-^omAT'^iOTi^
Capital punishment
OPTIMISTIC
EmEMELY SOMEWHAT ^OGimr-'-lJmm-'^n^
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Capital punishment
USEFUL1,2 3 , USELESS
I I
I I
^ 6 7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT
"SUmr-'-NnTHET-'-^l^^ Intii tK SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
Capital punishment
HAPPY
Capital punishment
ATTRACTIVE
1 2 3^2^ UNATTRACTIVE
eMely somewhat '-^ir-'-lfimEr-'-^^
Capital punishment
FAIR12?/. UNFAIR
I I
^
I I I
^
^
extremly somemiat
-lOGimJ-'-lfEifHE^'-^^^
Capital punishment
VALUABLE
1 T o , worthlessIII ^ ^ ^EXTRmr SOMEWHAT ^LIGHlO nHtHEF-'-IugHTO-'^^^
Capital punishment
REWARDING
1 , - , PUNISHING
I ,
^
,
^ 5 6 7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NETfHET-'-lLIGFmir'"^oF^^
A new topic is about to be displayed. Please wait.
National health insurance
,
,
PUNISHING
^
,
2
,
3
^
A 5 6 7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT ImEMELY
National health insurance
ATTRACTIVE
UNATTRACTIVE
1
I
2
^
3 4 5 6 7
"ETTITEHEIT suMtWHAT SLKjHTLV NEITHER SLIGHTLY ^ SQMeWHaT
^
EXTREMELY
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National health insurance
OPTIMISTIC
1
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT
USEFUL
1
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT
SLIGHTLY NEITHER SLIGHTLY"
National health insurance
SLIGHTLY NEITHER SLIGHTLY
National health insurance
PESSIMISTIC
7
SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
USELESS
7
SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
BENEFICIAL
1 2
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER SLIGHTLY"
National health insurance
HARMFUL
7
SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
GOOD
1
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER SLIGHTLY
'
National health insurance
BAD
7
SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
FAIR
1
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY " NEITHER SLIGHTLT
National health insurance
UNFAIR
7
SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
HAPPY
1
National health insurance
PLEASANT
1 2
National health insurance
SAD
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT ^LIGHTLY NEmET-'-^snGHT^
UNPLEASANT
7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER-'-SLjmT s^^
VALUABLE
1 2
EXTkEMELY * SOMEWHAT
3 4 5
SLIGHHV miTm * SLIGHTLY
WORTHLESS
7
SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
140
A new topic is about to be displayed. Please wait.
The MX missile
FAIR
1
UNFAIR
EXTOEMELY
~SOMEWHAr'-SlJG^^
|
'
NEITHER SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTRH^
The MX missile
USEFUL
^
I
2 3
^
^ ^
USELESS
The MX missile
ATTRACTIVE
^
J
2 3 ^
^ ^
UNATTRACTIVE
The MX missile
OPTIMISTIC
1 2 3 - ^ PESSIMISTIC
_I
I I I
^ ^ 7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITOFB qt tputt v * -I-fclTHER SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
The MX missile
REWARDING
1 2 3 4 5 ^
PUNISHING
mrnY'-sOTAr'-lUG^
The MX missile
GOOD
EXTREMLY SOMEWHAT ^LIGHTLY
—
Mru^^-mmr^-immT-^mmm
The MX missile
PLEASANT
1 0 , , UNPLEASANTi— I ' I ' , 'EXTOEWai SOMEWHAT "alGinLY »UlKt» SLIMTLI ' SOMMAT ' EXTOEHELt
The MX missile
VALUABLE
^
I
2 3
^
^
The MX missile
HAPPY
1 7 o .
EXTRE>,ELY SOMEWHAT"-
-^ZmT-^-mmT-^
-SLIGWnT
The MX missile
BENEFICIAL
In^J "SOMEWHAT '-snGimr-'-N^^
A new topic is about to be displayed. Please wait.
Professional football
PLEASANT
1 7 o .
EXTRMELY "^OTaT ^UGintr-'-lJEIT^
Professional football
OPTIMISTIC
1 9 o ,
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT
-gilGmLr-'-mTHER-'-^il^
Professional football
VALUABLE
1 P , _
WORTHLESS
7
SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
SAD
SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
HARMFUL
7
SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
UNPLEASANT
7
SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
PESSIMISTIC
7
EXTREMLY SOMEWHAT ^UGHTlJ-'-NEmER^
Professional football
USEFUL
1 7 T , .
SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
WORTHLESS
7
SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
USELESS
7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER~ SLIGHTLY
'
Professional football
BENEFICIAL
1 9 T , .
SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
HARMFUL
7
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Professional football
REWARDING
Professional football
ATTRACTIVE
1 ? .
EXTRDIELY SOMEWHAT ^LIGHTlT-'-lIIiraE^'-s^^
Professional football
GOOD
I 9 o .
EXTREMELY "^MhaT ^UGimJ-'-lfE^^
Professional football
PUNISHING
7
SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
UNATTRACTIVE
7
SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
BAD
SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT " SLIGHTLY NEITHER SLIGHTLY
Professional football
HAPPY
1 9 o , _
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT
~SriGHTlJ-'--N^^
A new topic is about to be displayed. Please wait.
Space exploration
VALUABLE
I 2
UNFAIR
6 7
SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
SAD
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER SLIGHTLY
Space exploration
OPTIMISTIC
1 2 1 /. r
SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
WORTHLESS
7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER SLIGHTLY
SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
PESSIMISTIC
6 7
I
SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
1 A3
Space exploration
USEFUL
1 2 3 , ^ USELESS
1^
I I I
^
,
^ 7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY " NEITHER - —^TTnvrTr^-^ 'iNtiiHtK SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
Space exploration
PLEASANT
1 2 3 /. , UNPLEASANT
5 K 7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHFR ct Tru-rr v 'i^xoni i til-HE SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
Space exploration
HAPPY1^2 3 4 5 ^ ^ SAD
Space exploration
BENEFICIAL
1 2 T / HARMFUL
I I
'
I
'
I
'
I
'
,
'
EmtMLY SOMEWHAT
-lUGiffU iTmim ,I.1U1L, ' SUMEWAT ' aWEMLY
Space exploration
FAIR17-,, UNFAIR
EXTRm SOMEWHAT "IlIGHILY CTEr-'-lLIGHTLr' SOMEWHAT ' EXTREMELY
Space exploration
REWARDINGin,, PUNISHING
I
^
,
^
,
* 5 6 7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER SLIGHTLY - SOMEWHAT EXTRMy
Space exploration
ATOACriVE
nNATOACTIVE
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER SO:GfffLr SOMEWHAT EXTRlilJ
Space exploration
GOOD
1
A new topic is about to be displayed. Please wait.
Labor unions
REWARDING
1 9
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT "SLIGHTtT-'-NEI^
Labor unions
PLEASANT
1 7 , .
BAD
0 7
bUMEWHAT EXTREMELY
PUNISHING
7
SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
EXTRJWELY
-SOMEWHAT ^UGHlT-'-NElfil^'-s^^
Labor unions
FAIR
I
UNPLEASANT
7
mi^EMELY SOMEMIAT
^iZGimT-'-llnTiER-'-mGm^
Labor unions
HAPPY
1 9 o ,
SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
UNFAIR
7
SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
SAD
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT
^OGmTJ-'-lJEITie-'--li^^
Labor unions
BENEFICIAL12 7/..
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT "silGHl!T-'-NEnMr-'^L^^
Labor unions
SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
HARMFUL
7
SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
VALUABLE
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER SLIGHTLT
Labor unions
WORTHLESS
7
SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
USEFUL
1 2
USELESS
7
U5
Labor unions
OPTIMISTIC
1 2
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY ~ NEITHER SLIcimT
Labor unions
PESSIMISTIC
7
SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
GOOD
1
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER SLIGHTLY
Labor unions
BAD
SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
ATTRACTIVE
1 UNATTRACTIVE
7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT
A new topic is about
SLIGHTLY NEITHER "ITjOnLT "lOMEWHAf-'1^
to be displayed. Please wait.
Ronald Reagan
VALUABLE
1 2
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER SLIGHTLY
Ronald Reagan
WORTHLESS
7
SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
USEFUL
1 2
I
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER SLIGHTLY
Ronald Reagan
USELESS
7
SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
HAPPY
1 2
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER SLIGHTLY
Ronald Reagan
SAD
SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
REWARDING
1 2
PUNISHING
6 7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
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Ronald Reagan
FAIR
^
, 2 3 , UNFAIR
EXTREMELY "SOMEWHAT" SLIGHTLY ~NFrn?gF-'--^ I |-^^^"I NEITHER SLIGHILY ^OMEWHaT-'eMS^
Ronald Reagan
GOOD
^
I
2 3 4
^
^
^BAD
eotemely
-soFffiWHAT-llGimj^ iNtiitUiK SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
Ronald Reagan
OPTIMISTIC
1 2 3 ^ ^ PESSIMISTIC
Ronald Reagan
PLEASANT
1 2 T / UNPLEASANT
I I
'
I
I
'
,
^
,
^
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT
~
-^uGHuy mmr-'-mGm:r^-sommr-^mm^
Ronald Reagan
ATrRACTIVE
I 2 , UNATTRACTIVE
I I ^ 5 6 7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT ^jlGHILY MEITlg^' SLIGHTLY ' SOMEWHAT 'mMJ
Ronald Reagan
BENEFICIAL
I 2 r, , HARMFUL
I— I '
I
'
,
'
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY MlF-'-^LJCmLr'"soFffiW^
A new topic is about to be displayed. Please wait.
Walter Mondale
GOOD
I n r, , BAD
I ^1 ^ I ' . ^ I ^
I
'
EXTliEMLY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY KEITHER ajcHLT SOHEMHAT ImSigJ
U7
Walter Mondale
HAPPY
^
I
2 3
^
^ ^
SAD
WfmmJ ""^OMEWHAr'^llGHl^ 1_NMTHER SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
Walter Mondale
BENEFICIAL
^
, 2 3 , • HARMFUI.
I I I
^ 6 7
EXTRPIELY ~ SOMEWHAT "
"SLIGHTLY " NEITHER -'
-
q, tpu-w v- ' itl SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTRENELV
Walter Mondale
REWARDING
1 2 3 , ^ PUNISHING
I I , * 5 A 7
EXTREMELY
-MifflAr-lLlGHTO^ INtiiHJiK SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
Walter Mondale
VALUABLE
1 2 3 i ^ WORTHLESS|__
I
I
I
^ 7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHFR qt tput, v 'til E SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY"
Walter Mondale
USEFUL
MmeEY SOMEWHAT
-lUGim:Y-'-MlTMR-'-^^
Walter Mondale
OPTIMISTIC
1 2 T / , PESSIMISTIC
I— I—
-L_i__l_i 1 ' 1 'EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT "SLIGHTLY NElfiM-'-^ilGinO-'^O^^
Walter Mondale
FAIR1,2 3 4 5 6 "f""
EXmm SOMEWHAT "silGHin-'-ljEIT^
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Walter Mondale
ATTRACTIVE12345^ UNATTRACTIVE
SOMEWHAT ' SLIGHTLY
'^^Eim-'-sIlGinLr' SOMEWHAT
' EXTREMELY
Walter Mondale
PLEASANT190, UNPLEASANT
HWHHJ SOMMIAT
-snGiiu! aeifiiER-'- U.HIL. ' SUMBffl.T
'
eXTHEMELY
A new topic is about to be displayed. Please wait.
A nuclear freeze
PLEASANT
1 9 ^ , UNPLEASANT11^,^ 5 6 7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEmET-'-SUOTLT'"^^
A nuclear freeze
BENEFICIAL
^
,
^
,
3 4 5 6 7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER SLIGHTLT SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
A nuclear freeze
ATTRACTIVE UNATTRACTIVE^,23 4 5 6 7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTmlJ
A nuclear freeze
USEFUL USELESS1,2 3 4 5 6 7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
A nuclear freeze
VALUABLE WORTHLESS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
U9
A nuclear frep7A
REWARDING
I 3
i
4
.1 1
5 6
1
1
7
1CJlIKliMELy SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY
A
NEITHER
nuclear freeze
SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT
-
1
EXTREMELY
HAPPY
1
EXTREMELY
3
1
4
.1
1
5 6
1
SAD
7
1SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY
A
NEITHER
nuclear freeze
SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
FAIR
1
1
2 3
1
4
.1 1.
5 6
1
IIl^FATRu n i rt i, i\
7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY
A
NEITHER SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
GOOD
1
1
2 3
1
4
i
1
5 6
1
BAD
7
1EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY
A
NEITHER
nuclear freeze
SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
OPTIMISTIC
1
1
2 3
1
4
1 1
.
5
1
6
1
PESSIMISTIC
7
1EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
A new topic is about to be displayed. Please wait.
Abortion
BENEFICIAL
1
1
2 3
1
4
1
1
5
1
6
HARMFUL
7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER
Abortion
SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTl^EMELY
PLEASANT
1
1
2 3
1
4
1 1
5
1
6
UNPLEASANT
7
1
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
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Abortion
GOOD
1
1
liXTREMELY
2 3
1
4
1
5
1
1
6
J_.
BAD
7
SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER
Abortion
SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT
1
liXTREMELY
VALUABLE
1
1
EXTREMELY
2 3
1
4
1
1
5
1
-1
6
1
WORTHLESS
7
SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER
Abortion
SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT
-
1
EXTREMELY
OPTIMISTIC
1
EXTREMELY
2 3
1
4
1
5 6
1
1
PESSIMISTIC
7
SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER
Abortion
SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT
1
bJCTREMELY
ATTRACTIVE
1 2 3 4 5
1
6
1
UNATTRACTIVE
7
1ilAlKcJltiLl SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER
Abortion
SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT
1
EXTREMELY
HAPPY
1
_.l
FYTPPNfTTT V
2
1
3 4
1
5 6
SAD
7
1SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER
Abortion
SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
FAIR
1 2 3 4 5
1
6
UNFAIR
7
1EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER
Abortion
SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT
1
EXTREMELY
REWARDING
1
1
2 3 4 5
1
6
PUNISHING
7
1EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER
Abortion
SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
USEFUL
1
mEMELv'
2
SOMEWHAT
'
3 4
1
5
1
6
USELESS
7
1
sLicirftlY NEITHER SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENTS
DISTRACTION
<Press REr^UK^f to continue>
You have just completed the a„t pa.t of this experiment.
<Press RETURN to contlnue>
This part of the experiment will foc„.= on , • iyou encountered in the first parr You are askpH ' °^ ^°Pi" ^^ichserious thought and reflection to thi ^n n ^° ^^""^ ^^""^^ minutes to give
of thought it is iinportant hat yo^ ^o ?hSm ^i"^^^^- ^^-^ -inute perioJnot permit your mind to wandeJ. "^"P^^ that you do
are up. ' buzzer will sound when the three minutes
<Press RETURN to continue>
Please think about:
ABSTRACT ART
THOUGHT
<Press RETURN to continue>
You have just completed the first part of this experiment.
<Press RETURN to continue>
This part of the experiment vd.ll for,i« , • •
you encountered in the first parr You^r. . t ."'"^^^ °^ ^°Pi" "hich
serious thought and reflection to'the ?oSJ luLo ^K 'k"' ^° 8^^^of thought it is iinportant that you do THINK .hn ^ ^^""^^ "^""'^ P^^i°d
not permit your mind to wander. ''^^ '"P^^^ ^"^^ that you do
are up. * sound when the three Biinutes
<Press RETURN to continue>
Please think about:
PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL
THOUGHT LISTING
<Presa RETTOH to continue)
V„„
.... j„3t oo.pXet.. th. at,t p„t Of tM,
.,p,..„„,
PLEASE READ THE FOLI«« SISSkIVaSSJ?;
This part, of the experiment win f„.,you encountered in the first Yon °" f "^"^^^ °f the topics whichserious thought and reflection' to 'the ?onL' '° '""^^ ^^^^^ mlnuEes to giJe
do"T;M-.h'"^'"K« '''' ^^-^ "inutf o'd";f';io;:hr''^^°"^ ^'"-^^-^^HIM about the topic, and that you Jo nor ' in>Portant that youEach tune a new thought occurs to vou n? "^"^ to wander,detailed instructions follow ' ' ^^^^"^ '^P^ into the computer More
Thank you for your cooperation.
In this part of
to continue>
-Pic hy co^'L'in as\:n?";::eJcerLSnir Jh 'l^' ^^^^^^^ ^ ^you can within three minutes. T^rnln^ S r" f "^""^ °^ ''^^ ^^P^^^ ^=screen and all you need to do is tJS ifseJr. "'^^ displayed on theyour thoughts. Please record eiery'Li^h? on rh' ""P^^^i""- "^ich expressPlease try to keep your sentences shorr^^ subject which occurs to you
EXPRESS ONLY ONE ?HU/pE"rs™JE°" ?o" iL'^^.T'- P--"etences as you want. *^ te as many or as few sen-
is t??J:d^^%":h:t'y;u°Jhr;k"' P-P°- °f ^his experiment
For example, if the word mi'ps'SS 1°
the following thought: " '° ^"^^^^ °" ^'^^ "^ght type
TULIPS
bloom in the spring.
or,
TULIPS
are beautiful flowers,
etc
.
BE SURE TO COMPLETE EACH THOUGHT WITH A PERIOD. (.)
155
POSTTEST
156
s.v,„-puc. seal., ,ol :L 1 ZllZ'llt =™ready to begin, press RETURN. experiment. When you are
<Press RETURN to continue>
PLEASE POSITION YOUR INdS H^GeTaSoJ? SS'S^ KEYSSelect the rating which best describes yo^^ ™iSIn"of the topic displayed above the scale. opmion
Professional football
OPTIMISTIC
1 2 T / . PESSIMISTIC
7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT
-SLIGHTLY mm^'-^nGmT^^Ofmi^^mmm
Professional football
VALUABLE19,, WORTHLESS
EXTOEMELY SOMEWHAT ^LIGHTLY NEITilF-'--silGiM:r'"l^^
Professional football
ATTRACTIVE
1
UNATTRACTIVE
7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER ' SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREFffiLY
Professional football
USEFUL
1
USELESS
7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER SIlGHTLr SOMEWHAT EXTmilJ
Professional football
PLEASANT UNPLEASANT1,2 3 4 5 6 7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
157
Professional football
FAIR
1 ,2 3 , UNFAIR
I
I I I
^ 6 7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHILY~ niftthvp '-?r^ I |NEITHER SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT " EXTTOmJ
Professional football
GOOD
1 2 3 , , BAD
7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHFB
~
'
ci rru-rr v ' 1bl ER SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTRENSJ
Professional football
BENEFICIAL
1 2 T / HARMFUL
7
EXTRmELY
-SOMEWHAT - ^nGimJ-'-NSirHEF-'-^^
Professional football
HAPPY!?>,. SAD
7
EXTREMLY SOMMAT
-IlIGHUY Nmrn-'-lUGMLr'"SOM^^
Professional football
REWARDING19-, PUNISHING
^
I
2^3^4 5 6 7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER SLIGHTLt' SOMEWHAT 'iXTmrnJ
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE THOUGHT LISTING
AND RATING TASKS
Now that you have finished rafino ^i.
In this part of
,^,/^^=^''^^N to continue>
topic by completing as
.SirseJteJcesV ^° ^^-^ thoughts on ayou can Within thrle minutes S"Le o^"th"^"''' "^"^ topxc as
tences as you want.
'^^ii^Lt. You can write as many or as few sen-
is tl^flnd'o'ut^whai'Jo'u^Jhrn'r' P^^^P^^^ °f ^his experiment
For example, if the word'^Sl'p.™ '° continue>
the following thought: '° ^^^^^"^ °" -^een. you might type
TULIPS
bloom in the spring.
or.
TULIPS
are beautiful flowers.
etc
.
BE SORE TO COMPLETE EACH THOUGHT MTU a PERIOD. (.)
that best reflects your opinion orShat Jhe".. . " P'^" °" ^^^^ scalesponding number key as soon as you ZTe lelllZ ^^P^ ^he corre-thought on how LIKELY or UNLIKELY it thll ,/- ^^^^ ^^te eachhow BAD or GOOD what the thought discJJbeS L / "i^l ^^tescales look like: ^e ri s is. Here is what the two kind^
S S^JH^J°.^f so ™. ™„ c.„ „.
To rate how LIKELY or UNI TITFT V
'"^^^^^^^
you believe that the sS^emf^t is 4m""\''' ''''''^ ^^^-Sl^
rating which best describes how str^^^i". ^ LIKELY-UNLIKELY
statement is TRUE.
ongly you believe or disbelieve that the
Sn^\^Llh"er:n' ^he^Ki^Sr ^ IV'"^^'"™^ ^^^^^the sentence seems to be. Think about wll^ T""" '^"^
about the topic, irregaJdless of ull^l I '^^^ something GOOD or BAD
HOW WILL OR ?00kY WR?™ TOElES^ri^ E^rSES'^'g^ ™- ^^^^sentence says about the GOODNESS or BADNiss^f thfraPIC
For example, if the statement wer e,
TULIPS ARE BEAUTIFUL SPRING FLOWERS.
llVomt^To':'' °^ ^">P^^- ™^IPS are
,
<Press RETURN to continue>
S:\L°?e;S'sa%faLTiL"Slic^^' yourself the following question: If what
how GOOD oT.r.Z:lTl.l^^^^^^^^^ - - - not,
S^TrMT' ''''' - '''' i?'3o"1Lt'L
In the example given above, the word TULIPS is the TOPTf of hho
S On^he otSr h H 'f^r ""^ "'^'^ "^^^y SLIGHTLY or SOMHfflATSly pSisSn Z ?; . ^^^^^ ^^o^^ain a dangerous
BAD ratJer mnn""^ . r''*' ^"P^^^^ ^^at TULIPS areU h than GOOD, and that they are SOMEWHAT or EXTREMELY BAD.
In other words, if you think that the sentence says something GOOD about itsTOPIC, you should select SLIGHTLY, SOMEWHAT or EXTREMELY GOOD. If you
think it says something BAD about its TOPir „ u -,
.
BAD ratings. ^"^^ ^"^^C- 7°" should choose one of the
In the final part of thi<? pvnoi-im^^^
statements on the same scSes wSch^n.f ^""^ ^"'^^ '° ^^'^^ ^ ""^"er of
First you will rate the'SL^:^ f0 ° h^L KM^S^iSy "^.^^^T"'^-will rate them on the GOOD-BAD scale. ^^^^=^1 -UNLIKELY scale, and then you
Thank you again for your cooperation in this experiment.
<Press RETURN to continue>
Example f ^ tU^H ciHiH,
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"Professional f o o t b a 1 1 . - . 8
. 1 2 . 6 . 8 . 4
7
"isabiggame"
3593
, 1 221,1 4840
, 9326
^0)
"is woluntary"
6622
,
732 ,4864, 6203^^
"exciting to match"
69 1 3
,
1 4 73
, 6231
, 27B8|
"Is a game of luck aaaand chance"
10043
.
2769
, 79 27 , 71 49
,Q.-l3
"is blou,n out of proportion soraetim
6665,2043,4965,6521 (^^^
"can be rewarding"
1 0870
, 1 242 , 4976 , 533
^3,3^
"is often accompanied ulth pain"
7547, 1932, 7721
,
4452
^, -2^
"Is adream for many young males"
4479. 2439. SA'^^ er-TQA
es'
1 I r
4-
u
. u , I U2yu
, / n 1 , d , o
13
/ ?
^8
MODAL BELIEFS SCALE
164
Professional football is a lot of fun for its many fans.
LIKELY
I UNLIKELY
6 7
Professional football does not interest me.
LIKELY
1 UNLIKELY
7
^TRmFLY SOMEWHAT ^UGinLF-'-^JllfHE^'-^^^
Professional football is exciting.
LIKELY
1 UNLIKELY
7
EXTOEmY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER "'-lIlGMir'^OiTOr-'lmS^
Professional football makes excessive profits for the
LIKELY
I
UNLIKELY
7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHT1.Y NEITHER SLIGHTLT SOMEWHAT EXTRDMJ
165
Professional football is fun to watch.
LIKELY
^
J
2 3
^
^ ^
UNLIKELY
NblTHER SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTRIIlY
Professional football is very dangerous for the players.
LIKELY1^2 3 ^
^
^
UNLIKELY
Professional football is often shown on television.
LIKELY
_^ ,
2 3
^
^
UNLIKELY
EXn^mELY
-SONSWHAT-^i^^
Professional football is a very silly game.
LIKELY
1 , , , UNLIKELY
I
^
.
^
,
^
, 5 6 7
EXTT^EMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER-'-SUGimj-'^O^^
Professional football is an American past time.
^^^f^^ , UNLIKELY,2,3.4 5 6 7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NETTHEI^' SLkShILV SQMEVHaT EXTTOIT
166
Professional football is a violent and brutal sport.
LIKELY
^
,
2 3 4 . UNLIKELY
I,
I I I
^ 6 7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT"
"
SLIGHTLY "
-
NEITHFR ' rru^ v"' Ihl E SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTRlmJ
Professional football makes a lot of its players very rich.
LIKELY12 3-^ UNLIKELY
I
I
I
I
^ ^ 7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHFl? ' ct tpu^ v ' Ii.xoni].i tlTHER SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
Professional football is enjoyed by most men.
LIKELY
1 2 T / UNLIKELYIII ^ ^ ^mmm somewhat ^OGHir-'-wim-'^nmr'"s^^
Professional football demands a lot of strength and skill from the player.
LIKELY19-, UNLIKELY
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEmEr-'-^nGHi:r'"s^^
Professional football cancels too many TV shows.
,
,
UNLIKELY
I
I I
^
I
^
6 7
EXTRmj SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER SLIGHTLt' SOMEWHAT ' EXTREMELY
167
Professional football is a rough contact sport.
UKELY
1 2 3
'
A cr UNLIKELY
^1
I I I I
^ 7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY " METTHFl? ' qt tpu^ v ^ INhlTHER SUGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
Professional football oavs ir<5 nicw<.».^ ^p y Its players too much money.
LIKELY
1 2345^ UNLIKELY
mmm - SOMEWHAT'-lu^
Professional football is watched frequently on Sunday afternoons.
LIKELY12,, UNLIKELY1.^,^,5 6 7
EXTREMLY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEiraEF-'-^UGHTLr'"s^^
Professional football is a short lived career for the players.
LIKELY t, unlikely1^.2.^ 5 6 7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER SLIGHTLT SOMEWHAT ECTIMJ
Professional football is a great excuse to have a party.
^^^^ UNLIKELY,23 4 5 6 7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
Professional football is bet on all the time.
LIKELY
1
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY'
4 UNLIKELY
I
I
^
You have finished "the s^^;;;;;;s on JS^HSeLY EXTfOTY
will rate them on the GOOD-BAD scales T^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^
the sentence seems to be. Think a?out'whI^h
/°"'"
about the topic, irregaJdless of wh«^ ^^^^ something GOOD or BAD
HOW WELL OR
^OO^rSlmJ^SElES^rigE^JlESr^l?' ^^'^
sentence says about the GOODNESS or BaSnSs of ?6pi?
<Press RETURN to continue>
Professional football is a lot of fun for its many fans,
GOOD
1 BAD
™E>1ELY somewhat ^LIGHILY NElfHEF-'-sOG^
Professional football does not interest
GOOD
1
BAD
EXTOEMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER SLIGHTLT SOMEWHAT ' EXTREmJ
Professional football is exciting.
GOOD
1
BAD
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEITHER SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
168
169
Proiessi„„l f„„.b.U
..kes e,„».i.e profits £„, o.„,„.
GOOD
1
BAD
EXraiMELY SOMEWHAT
^lJGHTTT-'n?Eimr-'-l^^ I L_^E-iiHtR SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
Professional football is fun to watch.
GOOD
ex™ SOM^AT ™r-'-MlfHE^i-™^l^,_^l_^
Professional football is very dangerous for the players.
GOOD
1
I
2 3 4 5 6 ^
SAD
SOMEWHAT
-'-SLIGHIir-'-T^^
Professional football is often shown on television.
GOOD12 7/ BAD
I
^
I
^
I
^56 7
EXTT^EMLY SOMEWHAT ^LIGHTLY mmR-^-^umTr^-^mmr-^WrmmJ
Professional football is a very silly game.
GOOD
1 , - ,
BAD
^
I
2^345 6 7
EXTREMELY SOMElfflAT SLIGHTLY mHEF-'-lUGimT-'-sW^
170
Professional football aD i IS an American past time.
GOOD
1 2 -5
EXTREMELY
"^OMEWHat'-^OgH^
__|
'
NEITHER SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT ' EXTRmY
Professional football is a violent and brutal sport.
GOOD
1
BAD
froUssM fo„tb,U mk„
. lot of it, pi„„,
GOOD
_J. I '
I
^
,
'
3
Professional football is enjoyed by most men.
GOOD
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT
-^LlGETUn'-imT^
Professional football demands a lot of strength and skill from the player.
GOOD
'
I
^'345
mmmj
-mmmr
-mrnmr-' ntnmi ' lightly ' somewhat ^ismm
171
Professional football cancels too .any TV shows.
GOOD
-J I
'
I
^
I
^ 5
EXTRDffiLY SOMEWHAT~ SLIGHTLY
~
^fFT^m^p -'- - I I^^^iii NEITHER SLIGHTLY ^OMEWHAT-'lmD^
Professional football is a rough contact sport.
GOOD
'
,
2 3 . . .
7
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT
^LJGHTlT-'-liEITTlR^ I-NtilHhR SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY
Professional football pays its players too much money.
GOOD
—I
' I '
I
'
I
^
,
^
Em^MLY
-IWaT ^UGim^
Professional football is watched frequently on Sunday afternoons.
GOOD
1 2 T / . BAD
I—
I
'
I
'
I
'
EXTREmY SOMIMIAT
-SLIGHTLY NEITllF-'-silGHflT-'^^^
Professional football is a short lived career for the players.
GOOD
1 9 o , BAD
EXTREMELY SOMEWHAT SLIGHTLY NEmEF-'-sOGHTL^
Professional football is a o,-o=^xi IS great excuse to have a party.
GOOD
1 2 T
EXTREMELY
""SOMEWHaT'-SUGH^
^|
'
NEITHER SLIGHTLY
^OMEWHaF-'EXtW?
Professional football is bet on all the time.
GOOD
1
BAD
EXTRE>IELY
-loFiWHAr'-^lJGi^ L_iNciiHiK SLIGHTLY SOMEWHAT EXTREMELY

